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The 2011 dispute between the National Football League (“NFL” or “League”), 
representing the football teams, and NFL Players’ Association (“NFLPA,” or “Players” 
or “Players Association”), the union representing its football players, oscillated among 
the collective bargaining table, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), and the 
courts. The League preferred labor law as the matrix of the controversy. The Players 
preferred antitrust law. Ultimately, the union’s most powerful weapon was not with 
withholding player services in a strike, but to challenge various anti-competitive 
arrangements wanted by the teams under the antitrust laws. 
The 2011 litigation muted the players’ option to choose between collective bargaining 
and antitrust litigation, making it somewhat less likely that players will alternate 
between choosing a union as their representative and then disclaiming it. It makes it 
clear that the labor exemption to the antitrust laws runs more broadly than the 
narrowest definition of collective bargaining. It also, considering the sides taken by the 
teams and the players, signals that there is something about the economic structure of 
product and labor markets in professional sports—and perhaps entertainment 
industries more generally2—that radically differs from the structure of product and 
labor markets in other industries.3   
The controversy was widely publicized and undoubtedly drew more public attention 
than any labor-management dispute in recent years.  Its notoriety provides an 
opportunity to review the relationship between federal labor and antitrust law, and 
more generally to consider how competition law should operate in the entertainment 
industry, which is characterized by many anti-competitive arrangements and pressure 
to manage new types of competition arising from a technological revolution.  
                                                 
2 See generally Harold L. Vogel, Entertainment Industry Economics: A Guide for Financial Analysis at 22-
30 (8th ed. 2011) [hereinafter "Vogel"] (comparing movies, television, music, broadcasting, cable 
television, publishing, the Internet, games, gambling, sports, performing arts, and amusement parts as 
divisions of the entertainment industry). 
3  See Paul D. Staudohar, Playing for Dollars: Labor Relations and the Sports Business  at 6 (1996) 
[hereinafter “Playing for Dollars”]  (asserting that professional sports is part of the entertainment 




"Current sports antitrust doctrine is muddled, confusing, and often incoherent . . . ."4 In 
other words, the law regulating entertainment labor markets is an ass:5 it privileges 
anti-competitive structures in professional and college football; it leaves college athletes 
wholly without protection; and it is irrelevant in the lower tiers of theatre and 
moviemaking. The significance of the NFL lockout is not that it drew some crisp new 
line defining a boundary of the labor exemption to the antitrust laws. Rather the lesson 
it teaches is that, when the law is healthy, it accommodates itself to realities of the 
marketplace. Hopefully that will prove to be the case in the other entertainment 
industries as well. This article is intended to contribute to that accommodative outlook. 
Collective bargaining, and hence the labor exemption, is of small and diminishing 
importance as the revolution in major parts of the entertainment industry gains 
momentum. In theatre and movie production workers must seek protection politically 
and through the minimum-wage laws, while producers seek legitimate—and 
illegitimate—limits on competition under the antitrust rule of reason. Ultimately, 
market forces, changing with technological advances, will dominate, not law.   
It is widely accepted that antitrust law regulates product markets, while labor law6 
regulates labor markets.7 The boundary between the two is the boundary of the labor 
exemption to the antitrust laws. That boundary is, however, inherently artificial.8 
Successful collective bargaining and compliance with other labor law increases labor 
                                                 
4  Kreher, 6 Va. Sports & Ent. L. J. at 54 (advocating different insights and different rules for sports 
industry). 
5 “If the law believes that, the law is an ass . . . .”  North American Soccer League v. National Football 
League, 505 F.Supp. 659, 659 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (quoting Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist; and rejecting 
antitrust challenge to NFL rules prohibiting teams owners from owning teams in competing leagues), 
aff'd and rev'd on other grounds, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that ban on ownership of teams in 
competing leagues violated Sherman Act under rule of reason analysis). 
6  Labor law is not just the law of collective bargaining, but also includes minimum 
wage and maximum-hour law, worker's compensation law, and unemployment 
compensation law. 
7  See Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 Stanford L. Rev. 991, 992-995 (1986) [hereinafter 
"Campbell"]. 
8  Campbell 38 Stanford L. Rev. at 993. 
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costs, and this reduces output and or increases prices in product markets.9 Unionized 
employers will be driven out of business by non-union competitors unless collective 
bargaining is accompanied by some kind of product-market restraints. Labor market 
restraints can be identical to product market restraints prohibited by the antitrust 
laws,10 or collateral regulation of product market competition can be indirect and subtle. 
In any event, "Without economic refinement, rewards obtained from effect on the 
product market and those obtained from effect on the labor market are inextricable."11 
The literature about the labor exemption – and on collective bargaining in general – 
assumes that the question is how to increase the welfare of workers without damaging 
the product market too much. In the context of this article, the question is different: it 
considers how to adapt the antitrust laws to a socially beneficial revolution that mainly 
affects product markets and increased consumer welfare. The revolution contracts the 
boundary between labor markets and product markets and also makes the boundary 
less distinct. 
In professional sports the interesting conflicts are at the top. In the other entertainment 
industries the interesting conflicts are at the bottom. The technological revolution is 
leading to disintermediation and fragmentation of production and consumption. That 
means that the firms and players at the top are threatened by those at the bottom. 
This article describes those revolutionary phenomena and explains why the boundaries 
of the labor exemptions are particularly difficult to define in the entertainment 
industries, including professional sports. It also predicts that controversies over the 
scope of the labor exemptions and broader controversies over the application of 
antitrust law will become more frequent as technology enables employers to push more 
work beyond the boundaries of conventional firms and opens up new revenue 
opportunities for employers and some employees. Technology’s tendency to blur the 
boundaries separating employment from entrepreneurship also will strain the line 
separating labor from product markets. 
The effect will be to push more controversies about the legality of relevant action from 
the relatively certain territory of traditional interpretations of the labor exemptions into 
                                                 
9  Campbell, 38 Stanford L. Rev. at 997. 
10  Campbell, 38 Stanford L. Rev. at 999 (characterizing insights of Archibald Cox). 
11  Campbell, 38 Stanford L. Rev. at 998. 
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less familiar territory, testing the boundaries of the exemptions and necessitating 
balancing of anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects under antitrust law’s rule of 
reason.  
This article begins with a brief review of the NFL lockout litigation. Then it analyzes the 
special features of entertainment product and labor markets and recapitulates basic 
antitrust and labor-law concepts and their application to specific restrictions on 
competition common in entertainment markets. It argues that over-aggressive 
definition and enforcement of copyright is probably the greatest threat to realization of 
the fruits of new technologies in the entertainment field. Copyright provides an anti-
competitive beachhead for extending anticompetitive mechanisms at least as strong as 
collective bargaining.12 
Finally it explores technology’s revolution in major parts of the industry, and explains 
how there is hope for the future. The technological revolution – not the present one but 
the previous one – has already changed the landscape of NFL economics, shifting the 
most relevant revenue stream to television broadcast revenues. This is a foreshadowing 
of what's beginning to happen in the rest of the entertainment industry 
Defining the boundaries of the “entertainment industry” is challenging. To make the 
analysis manageable, the article focuses on professional football—the NFL—as 
representative of professional sports more generally, occasionally also noting relevant 
developments in other sports. Professional football produced the recent litigation that 
invited the inquiry. It uses popular music, including rock and country, as the exemplar 
for music, saving symphony orchestras and dance bands for someone else or another 
time. It ranges more broadly with respect to theatre and movies, including the spectrum 
from Broadway plays to storefront community theatre, and the spectrum from 
Hollywood blockbuster to narrative YouTube videos. The broader scope for scripted 
entertainment is warranted because it is here where the impact of the technological 
                                                 
12  See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New architectures for music: Law Should Get Out of the Way, 29 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 259 (2007); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Flanking the DRM Maginot Line Against 
New Music Markets, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L LAW 113 (2007); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Music Markets and 
Mythologies, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 831 (2010); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New Business Models 
for Music, 18 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 63 (2010); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cut in Tiny Pieces: Ensuring 




revolution is most intense. The limited scope for music is warranted because symphony 
orchestras and dance bands account for a relatively small part of music consumption, 
and they—symphony orchestras, anyway--are organized completely differently from 
other parts of the music industry. 
II. Background of the NFL controversy 
For the last sixty years, the interplay between labor and antitrust law has shaped 
collective bargaining in the professional football industry. 
Professional football did not establish a significant presence in the public mind until the 
late 1930s.13 The Players Association emerged in the mid 1950s, but the NFL refused to 
deal with it until the Association threatened antitrust litigation against the League.14 In 
Radovich v. NFL,15 , the Supreme Court held that professional football—unlike major 
league baseball16—was not categorically exempt from the antitrust laws. Eleven years 
                                                 
13 Playing for Dollars at 57-58. 
14 Playing for Dollars at 65. 
15  352 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1957) 
16 In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-
209 (1922),  the Supreme Court exempted professional baseball from the Sherman Act by concluding that 
it did not involve interstate commerce.  
 In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam), the Court adhered to its decision in 
Federal Baseball Club, in a very similar baseball case, premised on the baseball industry's reliance on that 
decision and Congress's failure to overturn it. 346 U.S. at 79.  
In Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), the Supreme Court declined to extend the 
baseball exemption beyond baseball, suggesting that Federal Baseball was wrongly decided. 352 U.S. at 
452. The Court was unwilling to overrule it, however, because: 
"more harm would be done in overruling Federal Base Ball than in upholding a ruling which at best was 
of dubious validity. Vast efforts had gone into the development and organization of baseball since that 
decision and enormous capital had been invested in reliance on its permanence. Congress had chosen to 
make no change. All this, combined with the flood of litigation that would follow its repudiation, the 
harassment that would ensue, and the retroactive effect of such a decision, led the Court to the practical 




later, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) recognized the NFL Players 
Association (“NFLPA”) as the exclusive bargaining representative of all NFL players, 
and the NFL and the NFLPA entered into their first collective bargaining agreement 
(“CBA”).17 
In 1972, several players filed an antitrust action against the League in Mackey v. NFL,18 
alleging that the League's “Rozelle Rule,” restricting movement of free agents—players 
whose contracts with a particular team have expired—violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. 
The court concluded that the restriction violated § 1, because it was significantly more 
restrictive than necessary to serve any legitimate purposes of maintaining competitive 
balance in the NFL. While the Mackey litigation was pending, the collective agreement 
between the League and the Players Association expired, and seventy-eight NFL 
players filed a separate class action antitrust suit against the League.19 In 1977, the 
League and the players entered into a settlement agreement incorporating a new 
collective bargaining agreement that implemented a revised system of free agency 
known as “right of first refusal/compensation.”20 
In December 1982, the Players engaged in a fifty-seven-day strike before agreeing to a 
new collective agreement that included a modified version of the “right of first 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub.L. 105-297, Oct. 27, 1998, 112 Stat. 2824, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 26b, 
partially repealed the baseball exemption to "to state that major league baseball players are covered under 
the antitrust laws (i.e., that major league baseball players will have the same rights under the antitrust 
laws as do other professional athletes, e.g., football and basketball players), along with a provision that 
makes it clear that the passage of this Act does not change the application of the antitrust laws in any 
other context or with respect to any other person or entity." 15 U.S.C. § 26b note (quoting purpose section 
of Curt Flood Act). 
In United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955), the Supreme Court declined to apply the baseball 
exemption to theatrical productions, reasoning that the baseball exemption was limited by a narrow 
application of stare decisis,16 the same reasoning applied by the Court two years later to football, in 
Radivitch.  
17  See Brady v. NFL, 644 F.3d 661 at 663-664 (detailing history). 
18  543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir.1976) 
19 See Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280, 282 (8th Cir.1978); Alexander v. NFL, No. 4–76–123, 1977 WL 1497, at 
*1 (D.Minn. Aug. 1, 1977). 
20   Brady, 644 F.3d at 664 (detailing history). 
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refusal/compensation” system. This agreement expired in 1987, and when negotiations 
for a new CBA proved unsuccessful, the Players struck again and filed an antitrust suit 
in Powell v. NFL,21 alleging among other things that the League's free agency restrictions 
violated the Sherman Act. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the nonstatutory 
labor exemption applied, pursuant to Mackey.22 
Two days after the Powell decision, in November, 1989, the Players Association 
abandoned collective bargaining rights in an effort to end the NFL's nonstatutory labor 
exemption. The Players Association disclaimed its union status, enacted new bylaws 
prohibiting it from engaging in collective bargaining with the League, filed a labor 
organization termination notice with the U.S. Department of Labor, obtained a 
reclassification by the Internal Revenue Service as a “business league” rather than a 
labor organization, and notified the NFL that it would no longer represent players in 
grievance proceedings.23 
In 1990, eight individual football players brought a new antitrust action against the 
League in McNeil v. NFL,24 contending that new player restraints imposed by the 
League during the 1990–1991 season violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. On September 10, 
1992, following a ten-week trial, a jury found the NFL in violation § 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.25 The individual players then sought injunctive relief to become free 
agents for the 1992 season.26 Two new antitrust lawsuits were filed in the two-week 
period after the McNeil verdict. Ten NFL players brought suit in Jackson v. NFL,27 
alleging that the League's free agency restrictions violated the Sherman Act. Five other 
                                                 
21  678 F.Supp. 777, 780–81 (D.Minn.1988), rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989). 
22  930 F.2d at 1298. 
23  644 F.3d at 664-665. 
24  790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992). 
25  15 U.S.C. § 1. See McNeil v. Nat'l Football League (Plan B Free Agency), No. 4–90–476, 1992 WL 315292, 
at *1 (D.Minn. Sept. 10, 1992). 
26 See Jackson v. Nat'l Football League, 802 F.Supp. 226, 228 (D.Minn.1992); White v. Nat'l Football 
League, 822 F.Supp. 1389 (D.Minn.1993).. 
27  802 F.Supp. 226, 228–229, 234 n. 14 (D.Minn.1992). 
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NFL players instituted White v. NFL,28 a class action alleging that various practices of the 
League, including free agency restraints, the college draft, and the use of a standard 
NFL player contract, violated the antitrust laws.  
In January 1993, the parties reached a tentative agreement to resolve White and related 
cases. The Players Association subsequently collected authorization cards from NFL 
players redesignating the organization as the players' exclusive collective bargaining 
representative, and the NFL voluntarily recognized the NFLPA as the players' union on 
March 29, 1993. The district court approved the parties' Stipulation and Settlement 
Agreement (“SSA”) in April 1993, and the NFL and the NFLPA entered into a new 
collective agreement shortly thereafter, amending the SSA to conform to the provisions 
of the new collective agreement.  The district court approved the requested 
amendments in a consent decree issued on August 20, 1993, retaining jurisdiction to 
supervise its implementation. The parties amended and extended the collective 
agreement in 1996 and 1998 and 2006.29 
In 1996, the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,30 holding that that the 
nonstatutory labor exemption applied to employer conduct that occurred during and 
immediately after a collective-bargaining negotiation, when it involved a mandatory 
subject of bargaining that grew out of the bargaining process. 
After 1993, the Players and the League operated under the White SSA, and the district 
court continued to oversee the settlement by resolving numerous disputes over the 
terms of the SSA and CBA. Whenever the NFL and the Players Association agreed to 
change a provision in the collective agreement, a conforming change was also made to 
the SSA. The SSA was thus amended several times, most recently in 2006, when the 
NFL and the NFLPA adopted new collective agreement, which ran  through the 2012–
2013 football season. Either side could opt out of the final two years of the agreement 
upon written notice. 
                                                 
28  822 F.Supp. 1389, 1395 (D.Minn.1993). 
29 White v. National Football League, 766 F. Supp.2d 941, 944 (D. Minn. 2011) (describing history of SSA 
and collective bargaining agreement); 644 F.3d at 665 (detailing history). 
30  518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
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In May 2008, the NFL opted out of the final two years of the SSA and CBA, citing 
concerns about operating costs and other elements of the agreements.31 
A major issue in the 2011 dispute was the teams’ demand that the players reduce their 
share of television revenues.32  Approximately half of NFL revenues come from 
broadcast contracts with the networks.33 Sharing television revenues is a mandatory 
subject of bargaining under section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act.34 The 
League and the Players Association negotiated for two years over a new agreement to 
take effect in March 2011 after the existing agreement expired. As a result, the SSA and 
CBA were scheduled to expire in early March 2011. Although the NFL and the NFLPA 
engaged in more than two years of negotiations, they were unable to reach an 
agreement. The League filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB in February 
2011, asserting that the union failed to confer in good faith.35 
As the deadline approached, the players voted to end the Players Association status as 
their collective bargaining representative. On March 11, 2011—the expiration date of the 
SSA and CBA—the Players Association notified the NFL that it disclaimed interest in 
continuing to serve as the players' collective bargaining representative, effective at 4:00 
p.m. The Players Association also amended its bylaws to prohibit collective bargaining 
with the League or its agents, filed a labor organization termination notice with the 
Department of Labor, asked the Internal Revenue Service to reclassify the NFLPA as a 
                                                 
31  644 F.3d at 666-667 (detailing history). 
32 See Clay Moorhead, Revenue Sharing and the Salary Cap in the NFL: Perfecting the Balanace Between 
NFL Socialism and Unrestrained Free-Trade, 8 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 641, 678 (2006) [hereinafter 
"Moorhead"] (reporting on early negotiation stances: players want 64% of total revenues; owners refuse to 
relinquish more than 57%). 
33 White v. National Football League, 766 F. Supp.2d 941, 945 (D. Minn. 2011); "The NFL’s national media 
revenue is the backbone of the business." Jake I. Fisher, The NFL's Current Business Model and the 
Potential 2011 Lockout 4 (May 4, 2010), http://harvardsportsanalysis.files.wordpress.com/2009/09/the-nfl-
business-model-and-potential-lockout.pdf [hereinafter "Fisher paper"]. For example, the Green Bay 
Packers earned 38% of its revenue in 2009 from TV and radio broadcasting, 15% from merch sales and 
licensing and endorsements, and only 20% from ticket sales. Fisher Paper at 21. 
34  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). See Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild of America, 531 F.Supp. 578, 607 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that share of pay television revenues was a form of profit sharing and therefore a 
mandatory subject of bargaining). 
35  644 F.3d at 666-667. 
16 
 
professional association rather than a labor organization, and notified the NFL that it 
would no longer represent players bringing grievances against the League. 
The League filed an amended unfair labor practice charge on March 11, alleging that the 
NFLPA's disclaimer was a “sham” and that the combination of a disclaimer by the 
union and subsequent antitrust litigation was “a ploy and an unlawful subversion of 
the collective bargaining process.” 
Individual players, funded by the Players Association, filed suit on the same day as the 
disclaimer, March 11, 2011, in Brady v. NFL,36 alleging that the anticipated lockout 
violated the Sherman Act and that other anticipated league actions, including a 
limitation on the amount of compensation that can be paid to recently drafted first-year 
“rookie” players, a cap on salaries for current players, and “franchise player” and 
“transition player” designations that restrict the ability of free agents to join a team 
other than their former team  anticompetitive practices similarly violated the Act.37 
On March 12, the League instituted a lockout of members of the Players Association 
bargaining unit, which included professional football players under contract, free 
agents, and prospective players who had been drafted by or entered into negotiations 
with an NFL team. The NFL informed players under contract that the lockout would 
prohibit them from entering League facilities, from receiving any compensation or 
benefits, and from performing any employment duties including playing, practicing, 
working out, attending meetings, making promotional appearances, and consulting 
medical and training personnel except in limited situations. 
 On April 25, 2011, the district court granted the Players' motion to enjoin the lockout. 
After staying the injunction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
reversed, holding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived the district court of 
jurisdiction to issue the injunction.38   
On August 4, 2011, the players and the league entered into a new collective bargaining 
agreement to run through the end of the 2020 season. 39 It explicitly provided that it 
                                                 
36  644 F.3d 661, 667 (8th Cir. 2011) (detailing history). 
37  644 F.3d at 667-668. 
38 Brady v. NFL, 664 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011). 
39 Art. 69, sec. 1. 
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superseded any conflicting provisions in the Settlement Agreement.40 It committed the 
Players Association not to file any suit against the NFL or any team or to give voluntary 
testimony in support of any issue covered by the agreement, unless in support of a 
claim of a breach of the agreement.41 
Paralleling the antitrust litigation, the players challenged a unilateral change in the 
arrangements for sharing television revenue with the players. In White v. National 
Football League (“the 2011 television decision”),42 the district court held that an 
agreement negotiated between the NFL and the television networks violated the White 
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement ("SSA"), which resolved the 1987 strike and 
lockout. The union claimed that an agreement to extend and renegotiate broadcast 
contracts with DirecTV, CBS, Fox, NBC, and ESPN violated the NFL's obligation under 
the SSA to act in good faith and use best efforts to maximize total revenues for both the 
NFL and the Players for each SSA playing season,43 after the NFL opted out of the final 
two years of the 2006 collective bargaining agreement and SSA.44 Shortly after that, the 
League negotiated extensions of its broadcast contracts to cushion its economic losses in 
the event of a strike or lockout.  
The district court found that broadcast revenues are "an enormous source of shared 
revenue” for the Players and the NFL.45 It concluded that the League violated the SSA 
by negotiating with the broadcasters to advance its own interests and harm the interests 
of the players. "[U]nder the terms of the SSA, the NFL is not entitled to obtain leverage 
by renegotiating shared revenue contracts, during the SSA, to generate post-SSA 
leverage and revenue to advance its own interests and harm the interests of the Players. 
Here, the NFL renegotiated the broadcast contracts to benefit its exclusive interest at the 
expense of, and contrary to, the joint interests of the NFL and the Players. This conduct 
                                                 
40 Art. 2, sec. 1. 
41 Art. 3, sec. 2. 
42  766 F. Supp.2d 941 (D. Minn. 2011). 
43  766 F.Supp.2d at 943 (describing issue and arguments). 
44 The SSA and the collective agreement originated in 1993. The collective agreement was amended and 
extended in 1996, 1998, and 2006. 766 F. Supp.2d at 944. 
45 766 F. Supp.2d at 951. 
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constitutes “a design ... to seek an unconscionable advantage” and is inconsistent with 
good faith."46  
The court ordered a further hearing to determine appropriate relief that was explicitly 
to consider both damages and an injunction.47 This lawsuit was settled as part of the 
overall resolution of the 2011 dispute. 
This decades long conflict represents, not a traditional labor-management controversy, 
but a struggle by participants in an entertainment industry to reconcile the pro-
competitive mandates of the antitrust law with the practical necessity of anti-
competitive measures to enhance the attractiveness of the entertainment product. Self-
interest on the part of both service providers (the players) and entrepreneurs (the team 
owners) naturally operates, but that is inherent in any market. 
III. Entertainment product and labor markets 
The NFL lockout litigation used the labor exemption to protect anti-competitive 
mechanisms in the product market. Antitrust law focuses on market realities, not 
formalistic distinctions. Accordingly, any antitrust analysis must begin with close 
examination of "the economic reality of the market at issue."48 John T. Dunlop’s classic 
Industrial Relations Systems emphasizes that industry structure and the 
microeconomics of product and labor markets, along with the law, determine the 
differing shape of industrial relations systems, including collective bargaining, in 
different industries.49 To explore the implications of the NFL controversy throughout 
the entertainment industry, one must begin with an analysis of market structure.  
                                                 
46  766 F. Supp.2d at 951. 
47  766 F. Supp.2d at 854. 
48  Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-467 (1992) (affirming reversal of 
summary judgment for defendant in tying and monopolization case after exhaustive exploration of the 
dynamics of supply and demand in carefully defined markets for copying equipment and service); 
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 111 (1984) 
(agreeing with district court that college football broadcasts constitute separate market). 
49 See Playing for Dollars at 4-5 (applying Dunlop’s insights to professional sports labor markets). 
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A. Industry structures and labor markets 
1. Corporate structures 
In professional sports, associations of teams, usually called leagues, exercise significant 
private regulatory power over individual teams. In American Needle, Inc. v. National 
Football League,50 however, the Supreme court held that the NFL was not a single 
enterprise entitled to the intra-enterprise exemption to the antitrust laws. It provided a 
useful summary of the structure of the NFL: 
"The NFL teams do not possess either the unitary decisionmaking quality or the single 
aggregation of economic power characteristic of independent action. Each of the teams 
is a substantial, independently owned, and independently managed business.  . . . The 
teams compete with one another, not only on the playing field, but to attract fans, for 
gate receipts and for contracts with managerial and playing personnel.”51  
Baseball and hockey are organized like football. Soccer is different. In Fraser v. Major 
League Soccer, L.L.C.,52 the court of appeals reviewed the industry structure for 
professional soccer in the United States, in considering a single-entity defense:  
"MLS has, to say the least, a unique structure, even for a sports league. MLS retains 
significant centralized control over both league and individual team operations. MLS 
owns all of the teams that play in the league (a total of 12 prior to the start of 2002), as 
well as all intellectual property rights, tickets, supplied equipment, and broadcast 
rights. MLS sets the teams' schedules; negotiates all stadium leases and assumes all 
related liabilities; pays the salaries of referees and other league personnel; and supplies 
certain equipment."53 
The controversy involved the league's control over player recruitment. "In a nutshell, 
MLS recruits the players, negotiates their salaries, pays them from league funds, and, to 
a large extent, determines where each of them will play. For example, to balance talent 
                                                 
50   ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (2010). 
51   130 S.Ct. at 2212-2213. 
52   284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002). 
53   284 F.3d at 53. 
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among teams, it decides, with the non-binding input of team operators, where certain of 
the league's “marquee” players will play."54 
The league contracts with investors to operate nine of the League's 12 teams. The 
operator/investors hire general managers and coaches and may trade players with other 
teams, pick players in the League draft, but pay not bid independently for players55 
They also must comply with a salary cap.56 A class of players claimed that the 
agreement not to compete for player services violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.57 
The court rejected the claims on market-definition grounds, but suggested that even 
outside the classic single entity situation exemplied by Copperweld, the rule of reason 
might show flexibility for  for interdependent multi-party enterprises. Sports leagues 
are a primary example but so are common franchising arrangements and joint ventures 
that perform specific services for competitors.58 It noted Justice Rehnquist's argument 
that all sports leagues be treated as single entities because they must collaborate to 
produce a product.59 
The rest of the entertainment industry is even more decentralized than professional 
football. Corporate entities, partnerships or sole proprietorships are the units of 
production. Trade associations exist, but exercise no regulatory power outside the 
standards-setting and enforcement arena. Collective licensing of copyrights for music is 
the notable exception.60 
                                                 
54   284 F.3d at 53. 
55  . 284 F.3d at 54. 
56   284 F.3d at 54. 
57   284 F.3d at 54-55. 
58   284 F.2d at 58. 
59   284 F.3d at 55, citing American Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissending from 
denial of certiorari). 
60  See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cut in Tiny Pieces: Ensuring that Fragmented Ownership Does Not Chill 




2. Sports and the rest – similarities and differences 
Entertainment industry product markets have characteristics that distinguish all of 
them from other industry product markets. Each entertainment industry also has 
product-market features that distinguish it from other entertainment-industries. 
The structure of the markets for professional sports is dramatically different from that 
of non-entertainment industries. Ethan Lock identified the following attributes of 
product markets in professional football: 
 No real substitutes exist for the NFL product; 
 The NFL regulates intra-league competition for fans and players, in the interest 
of competitive balance; 
 The NFL competes with no other football league for either players or fans.61  
The peculiar economics of the professional sports industry make application of 
antitrust- and labor-law doctrines developed for manufacturing and most service 
industries awkward. In most industries each firm seeks to avoid competition. In 
professional sports, a team cannot gain fans unless it has credible competition. In most 
industries, a firm seeks to extinguish its competitors. In professional sports, a team has 
an incentive to build up its competitors; if the competition is too weak, games will not 
be interesting, and the audience will fall off. Leagues such as the NFL developed to 
management these problems. “Sports leagues are . .  . cartels that exist to allocate and 
control the [product] and [labor] and to eliminate within the cartel competition over . . . 
players and . . . fans.62  
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have recognized the 
salience of unique product-market features in construing the antitrust laws. In NCAA v. 
Board of Regents,63 the Supreme Court held that restrictions by the NCAA on broadcasts 
of college football games violated the Sherman Act: 
"By participating in an association which prevents member institutions from competing 
against each other on the basis of price or kind of television rights that can be offered to 
                                                 
61 Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 Duke L. J. 339, 354-359 
(1989) (explaining uniqueness of employer-employee relationships in professional sports). 
62 Labor Relations in Professional Sports at text accompanying n.10. 
63  468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
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broadcasters, the NCAA member institutions have created a horizontal restraint—an 
agreement among competitors on the way in which they will compete with one another. 
. . . By restraining the quantity of television rights available for sale, the challenged 
practices create a limitation on output; our cases have held that such limitations are 
unreasonable restraints of trade."64 
Nevertheless, it noted the special characteristics of sports: 
" Some activities can only be carried out jointly. . . . What the NCAA and its member 
institutions market in this case is competition itself—contests between competing 
institutions. Of course, this would be completely ineffective if there were no rules on 
which the competitors agreed to create and define the competition to be marketed. A 
myriad of rules affecting such matters as the size of the field, the number of players on a 
team, and the extent to which physical violence is to be encouraged or proscribed, all 
must be agreed upon, and all restrain the manner in which institutions compete. 
Moreover, the NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football—college football. . . 
. In order to preserve the character and quality of the “product,” athletes must not be 
paid, must be required to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of the “product” 
cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such 
restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might soon 
be destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college football to preserve 
its character, and as a result enables a product to be marketed which might otherwise be 
unavailable. In performing this role, its actions widen consumer choice—not only the 
choices available to sports fans but also those available to athletes—and hence can be 
viewed as procompetitive."65 
These pro-competitive tendencies could offset anti-competitive effects in a rule of 
reason analysis.66 Finding no pro-competitive effects to offset the anti-competitive 
effects of the NCAA rules limiting television broadcasts of games, however, the Court 
affirmed the lower courts' finding of a Sherman Act violation.67 
                                                 
64  468 U.S. at 99-100. 
65  468 U.S. at 101-102. 
66  468 U.S. at 103-104 (distinguishing per-se from rule-of-reason analysis). 
67  468 U.S. at 120. 
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In American Needle,68 the Supreme Court acknowledged that the single-entity theory 
might shield certain types of NFL conduct: 
"Football teams that need to cooperate are not trapped by antitrust law. “[T]he special 
characteristics of this industry may provide a justification” for many kinds of 
agreements. The fact that NFL teams share an interest in making the entire league 
successful and profitable, and that they must cooperate in the production and 
scheduling of games, provides a perfectly sensible justification for making a host of 
collective decisions. But the conduct at issue in this case is still concerted activity under 
the Sherman Act that is subject to § 1 analysis."69 
“We have recognized, for example, that the interest in maintaining a competitive 
balance” among “athletic teams is legitimate and important. While that same interest 
applies to the teams in the NFL, it does not justify treating them as a single entity for § 1 
purposes when it comes to the marketing of the teams' individually owned intellectual 
property. It is, however, unquestionably an interest that may well justify a variety of 
collective decisions made by the teams."70 
Ethan Lock identified the following attributes of the labor market in professional 
football: 
 The value of a player depends not only on skills, but also on the player's attitude, 
conduct, age, and relationship with teammates; 
 Players have limited community of interest; 
 Players have limited job security and short working lives; 
 The NFL is the only buyer of player skills, which are not generally transferrable 
to other industries.71  
Professional sports share most of these characteristics. That baseball is treated 
differently from other sports is an anomalous result of the doctrine of stare decisis.72 
                                                 
68  ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010). 
69  130 S.Ct. at 2216. 
70  130 S.Ct. at 2217. 
71 Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 Duke L. J. 339, 354-359 
(1989) (explaining uniqueness of employer-employee relationships in professional sports). 
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Each of these attributes applies to the labor markets in other entertainment industries 
such as theatre and movies. Each of them, except the last, applies to the popular music 
industry, where there is sharp competition among record labels and other, newer, 
intermediaries that link the labor market to the product market. Collective bargaining in 
the popular music industry, unlike professional sports, theatre, and movies is of only 
marginal importance because most musicians—particularly those performing popular 
music are not traditional employees entitled to engage in collective bargaining. 
Labor costs are important in all of the entertainment industries. Player payrolls 
consumer more than half of total NFL revenue.73 In the movie industry, cast expenses 
comprise slightly less than 20% of the budget.74 Broadway's Spiderman reported that 
artistic labor costs accounting for 19% of production costs and 33% of running costs.75 In 
indie theatre, the percentages are a good bit lower, because personnel often are unpaid. 
One study of off-off-Broadwas products concluded that about 16% of the total budget 
was for artistic labor.76  
Though professional sports and other entertainment industries share some 
characteristics, they also differ in important ways. They are similar in that they depend 
on celebrity to draw audiences. They are similar in that their production is episodic: 
fans consume77 specific performances, games, movies, or musical works. 78 
                                                                                                                                                             
72 Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1188 (11th Cir. 2003) (applying baseball exemption but 
noting "dubious" application of stare decisis to preserve it). 
73 Fisher Paper at 21 (reporting 57% in 2008). 
74 See Ralph S. Singleton, Film Budgeting 7, 62 (1996) (detailing cost categories and cast costs for $15 
million movie; "cast unit" accounting for 19.67% of total); Deke Simon, Film and Video Budgets 230 (2010) 
(budget line items for $5 million feature film; "cast" and "extra talent" categories accouning for 17.98% of 
total). 
75 Letter from Christopher A. Cacace to Elizabeth Block attaching financial statements (June 2, 2011), 
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/206114/8-legged-productions-llc-2011-01-02-financial.pdf. 
76 Statistical Analysis of Off-Off-Broadway Budgets 8 (April 2008), 
http://www.nyitawards.com/survey/OOBBudgetStudy.pdf (7% for actors, including productions that did 
not pay actors; 4% for designed, including unpaid designers, 5% for director, stage manager, and crew). 
77   “Consumption” of entertainment includes attending a live event such as a football game, performance 
of a play, or music concert, and watching or listening to a game, a movie, or a music recording. 
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They are similar in that most players or performers have relatively short careers. They 
are similar in that they employ institutional frameworks to aggregate and concentrate 
the selection of talent: the draft in professional football, auditions for movies and plays. 
In this respect the labor markets are more highly organized than in most other 
industries, in which employment decisions occur on a purely ad-hoc basis, involving 
individual employees. 
Professional sports, theatre, and live music also are similar in that the product is 
consumed as it is produced. Football games, plays, and concerts can be recorded of 
course, but there is little market for such recordings. Movies and recorded music are 
similar in that production and consumption are separated. Capital is invested in 
making a studio recording or a movie on speculation, in the hope that consumption will 
be sufficient to provide a return on the investment. 
In all of the relevant industries, the supply of labor greatly exceeds the demand. Many 
more people would like to play professional football than there are slots on teams.79 
Many more actors would like to be in movies or stage plays than there are roles in 
productions. Many more musicians would like to perform than there are 
opportunities—although it is relatively easy for a musician to perform locally at small 
venues or at open-mic events. At the same time, professional athletes, actors, and 
musicians are not fungible. Each has unique characteristics that make him desirable or 
undesirable for a particular role. A football team would not recruit Tim Tebow to play 
guard. A casting director would not select Anthony Hopkins to play one of the young 
lovers in Brokeback Mountain or Justin Bieber to play a heavy in a gangster movie. 
Those distinguishing characteristics, however, are not all objectively measurable. One 
can measure the velocity of a quarterback’s pass, the size of his hands and feet,80; and 
time how fast he runs the 40-yard dash, but one can only guess at his leadership ability, 
                                                                                                                                                             
78  The more episodic the delivery of services to the audience, the more likely is independent contractor 
status rather than employee status. See § ___ (detailing criteria for distinguishing employees from 
independent contractors). 
79  Each of the 32 teams in the NFL are allowed 53 players on its roster. NFL Collective Bargaining 
Agreement art. 25 § 4 (Aug. 4, 2011) (limiting total on each team's active and inactive player lists to 53 
players); http://www.nfl.com/teams (listing 32 teams comprising NFL). 
80  See Thomas Jackson, QB's Hands: does Size really matter...?, http://www.eagleseyeblog.com/qbs-
hands-does-size-really-matter.html (reporting hand size of different NFL quarterbacks and discussing 
why hand size might matter) 
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pain threshold, charisma, and determination to win. Likewise, it is not difficult to 
determine if a singer has accurate pitch and a good sense of rhythm, but how truly he 
will portray the director’s idea of a particular character in a musical is a matter of 
artistic judgment. One therefore would not expect labor markets to be organized by 
mechanical rules common in other industries, such as seniority systems or selection or 
promotion strictly according to objective test results. 
In the most visible parts of entertainment industries81 the labor input comprises sharply 
differentiated skills and personalities. No one would consider Tom Brady fungible with 
Brett Favre in terms of personality or leadership styles. No one would view Casey 
Matthews82 as equivalent to Brian Urlacher83 in terms of skills and experience. No one 
would imagine Zac Efron or Jensen Ackles well suited for the same roles on stage or 
screen at as Anthony Hopkins or Jack Nicholson. A beginning actor cannot provide the 
star quality that many movie and theatre producers believe is necessary to attract an 
audience for a large-budget production. 
The bargaining structures for entertainment industries reflect the differing 
characteristics of the relevant labor markets. Bargaining structures are similar for 
different sports involving multi-employer bargaining, comprehensive player 
representation and membership, and two-tier bargaining in which the collective 
agreement provides a comprehensive framework for regulation of the labor market for 
each sport and also regulates certain aspects of the product market to assure 
competitive stability, while salaries are negotiated with individual players.84  
Professional sports labor markets share common characteristics: 
 Careers of players are short—3-5 years; 
 Rules limit player mobility from team to team;  
                                                 
81 In other less visible parts, many conventional employees toil away at performing accounting, 
marketing, information-technology, property-management, human-resource and scheduling functions. 
There is nothing particularly unusual about the labor markets for their services. 
82  2011 draft-pick rookie linebacker for Philadelphia Eagles. 
83 Veteran middle linebacker for the Chicago Bears. 
84 See Playing for Dollars at 10-11 (describing bargaining structure in professional sports). 
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 Television broadcast revenues are important;85 
 Vertical integration is limited, although there may be a trend for entertainment 
conglomerates to acquire teams; 
 Anti-trust law plays a disproportional role in regulating labor markets and their 
interaction with product markets; and  
 Non-union intermediaries such as agents are important.86 
Theatrical and movie labor markets also share common characteristics, but also exhibit 
differences: 
 Careers of actors are short, either because their celebrity status wanes, or, in 
lower ends of the market, because they give up on being able to make a living 
from their art.87 
 Product markets are highly stratified,88 
  With the bottom tier growing in importance. 
 Most actors and production personnel work on a project-by-project basis, 
 The workforce for each project is assembled on an ad-hoc basis; while there are 
repeat players, they must compete anew for each new project through auditions, 
 Collective bargaining governs labor markets in the upper tiers, but even there, 
many workers are not covered by collectively bargained terms. 
The differing product-market characteristics of professional sports as compared with 
other entertainment industries result in differences in labor markets: professional 
                                                 
85  For example, in 2000, close to 60% of the Green Bay Packers’ revenue came from television, 20% from 
tickets to games, and about 20% from “other”—mainly licensing of logos and paraphernalia. Vogel at 454. 
86 Playing for Dollars at 168-173 (“Commonality of Sports Models”). 
87 See generally New Business Models for Music at 18 Vill. Sports & Ent. L. J. at 111-136 (describing life 
cycle of indie musician). The life cycle of most actors is similar; they go to Chicago, study at Second City, 
Steppenwolf, the Artistic Home, or at dozens of other acting studios, get some roles in off-Loop theatre, 
and then go to New York or Hollywood, wait tables, and eventually come home to take up other careers, 
perhaps continuing to act on the side. 
88  In 2009, there were some 1825 regional non-profit theatres, compared with Broadway theatres 
numbering in the dozens. Vogel at 497 n.7. The non-profit theatre segment of the industry, comprising 
mainly off-Broadway and regional theatres earned $811 million in revenue in 2009. Vogel at 497 n.7. 
Contributions exceeded revenue, comprising $969 million, or 54%. Id. Broadway shows earned $939 
million from Broadway productions in 2007, and $950 from road shows, often performed by regional 
producers. Vogel at 482. 
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athletes have relatively long term relationships with their teams, and theatre actors 
have relationships with their producers for the run of a play; in the movie industry, 
actors have only fleeting relationships with their producers, where actor employment is 
terminated after a movie is shot, long before any consumers pay to see it. Until recently, 
musicians had relatively long-term relationships with their record labels, but the model 
is changing, so that the relationship between a musician and a producer ends once a 
song or album is recorded. 
3. Proximity of labor and product markets: thickness of the 
production function 
The labor markets differ in other important ways. The proximity of labor markets to 
product markets, reflected in the thickness of the enterprises that connect varies 
dramatically. The firms connecting athletes to sports fans—football, baseball, or 
basketball teams—are sophisticated enterprises. The same is true for movie production, 
distribution, and exhibition enterprises. Music lies at the other extreme: many singers 
and instrumentalists are the business entities that perform for audiences. They arrange 
their own live gigs and record and release their own music. In music, there is little 
distinction between product and labor markets and existing distinctions are 
diminishing. Live drama occupies an intermediate position, ranging on a continuum 
from Broadway producers to storefront theatre ensembles.89 Technology is slimming 
down the entrepreneurial intermediation for music and video entertainment, but not 
sports. 
The thickness of intermediation represents the distinction between product and labor 
markets, which, in turn defines the boundary between antitrust law and labor law. The 
robustness of the boundary between labor and product markets depends on the 
thickness of the production function:90 how many other inputs are involved, and how 
important, relatively, is a particular labor input? The scope of the labor exemptions to 
                                                 
89 A theatre ensemble is a group of actors who participate in the management of a theatre, expecting that 
they will be given priority in the casting of plays the theatre produces. 
90  A production function is a theoretical equation that specifies output as a function of different 
combinations of inputs. In basic microeconomics, the traditional inputs are labor, land, and capital. See 
Donald Stevenson Watson, Price Theory and its Uses 198 (1963) (illustrating production functions); Henry 
H. Perritt, Jr., New Architectures for Music: Law Should Get Out of the Way, 29 Hastings Comm. & Ent. 
L. J. 259, 301 (2007) (specifying production function for production of popular music). 
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the antitrust laws depends on separating product from labor markets, but that becomes 
more difficult the thinner the production function.  
In the lower strata of the popular music industry, there is little distinction between a 
worker and entrepreneur. In the top strata of the professional sports and movie 
industries there is a major distinction between the owners, coach and general manager 
of a team and the players, and between the Hollywood producer and the actor. The 
thicker the intermediation, the more likely is employee status for the talent as opposed 
to independent contractor status. The most interesting cases are when the production 
function is relatively thick, as in professional sports but collective-bargaining and 
enforcement of other labor laws is weak: indie movies and indie theater. 
4. Geographic scope 
The geographic scope of the relevant labor markets differs. Labor markets for theatre 
are predominantly regional. To be sure, many actors relocate to New York or Los 
Angeles, because that is where they think the opportunities to make it big are. But most 
actors and casting directors direct their attention to the metropolitan area in which they 
live and work. 
Labor markets for professional sports, on the other hand are national—international in 
the case of soccer and baseball. 
Labor markets for movies are predominantly regional, given the historic concentration 
of moviemaking enterprises in the Los Angeles area, and of television enterprises in Los 
Angeles and New York. But moviemaking involves—at least since the breakup of the 
studio system, beginning in the 1970s--principal photography at locations all over the 
world, and some recruiting of talent takes place in or near shooting locations. The 
technological revolution, by dispersing movie production dramatically, means that far 
more opportunities to work in moviemaking will be sought and filled locally—within 
particular metropolitan areas. Internet-based casting calls are inherently international, 
but the likelihood that an applicant will travel a long distance for an audition is small. 
5. Strength of worker attachment 
The length of employment is different. Actors and other talent for theatre and movies 
are recruited for particular projects—one run of a play, one movie. Athletes are 
recruited to sports teams for periods of several seasons, or at least one season. 
Recruiting a professional football player to play only one game is unheard of. 
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6. Bifurcation of live performances and recordings 
In music the recording and live-concert markets are sharply distinguished, although the 
same musicians often participate in both. In professional sports, consumption of 
broadcast games and live games is distinct, but the same event provides the content for 
both. 
7. Day jobs 
Participants in music, theatre, and movie labor markets typically hold other 
employment—“day jobs” are the norm.91 Day jobs are rare in professional sports during 
the season, but many professional athletes engage in a variety of non-sports 
employment off season, often related to investments made with their substantial 
salaries. Outside employment often is closely related to the athlete’s identity as an 
athlete, as with product endorsements, which may involve work during the season. 
8. Stratification 
Stratification of the sub-industries differs dramatically. Professional sports is not very 
stratified: most of the relevant activity is centered on the NFL for football, the NBA for 
basketball, and so on. Few fans consciously choose between going to an NFL game and 
going to a local league game, although some choose between professional and college 
football games. College sports are an enigma analytically. They are considered further 
in § ___. 
Other entertainment industries are hugely stratified, ranging in music from Sony to 
singer-songwriter Trevor Shandling, in movies from Dreamworks to Troglodyte 
Productions, and in theatre from the Schuman theatre chain on Broadway to the 
Weekend Theatre in Little Rock. 
One might try to force an apples-to-apples comparative analysis by equating the NFL in 
professional sports to big Hollywood studios in moviemaking, big recording labels in 
music, Broadway theatre and Live Nation for concert music. A separate analysis would 
                                                 
91  Professor Caves calls them “humdrum jobs.” Richard E. Caves, Creative Industries: Contracts Between 
Art and Commerce 79-80 (2002) (reporting empirical studies concluding that approximately seventy-five 
percent of artists of all kinds have humdrum jobs; income from art produced at most forty-six percent of 
total income; and for many, was negative).; see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New Business Models for Music, 18 
Vill. Sports & Ent. L. J. 63 (2011) (analyzing life-cycle of indie musicians and the role of day jobs to 
supplement music income). 
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address storefront theatre, indie musicians, indie moviemakers, and or community 
football leagues. 
The weakness, however, of this apparently tidier horizontal comparison is that it would 
obscure the important phenomena: the fluid movement of capital and labor vertically 
within the music, video entertainment, and movie industries, and the lack of such 
movement in professional sports. It is the increasing possibility of such vertical 
movement that poses the greatest likelihood of legal controversies, considered more 
fully in § ___. 
9. Cross subsidization 
Sports leagues force redistribution of revenue among the teams, especially revenue 
from broadcasting.92 They allocate players to clubs through mechanisms such as drafts 
of new talent, restrictions on player movement, and compensation to teams losing 
players to other teams.93 While some goals, such as the salary cap, are intended to limit 
competition in the labor market, others, such as the draft system, are intended as a way 
of channeling subsidies to the weaker teams.94 
10. Sources of revenue 
Professional football and the movie industry share the characteristic that most of the 
revenue comes from channels that might be thought to be ancillary to the main 
products. Television revenues account for about 60% of football revenues, compared 
with only about 20% for attendance at live games.95 Movie theatre ticket sales account 
for only about 20% of the revenue for the movie industry, compared with 40% for video 
and DVD rentals and about 40% for television.96  
Historically, it has been employees who have insisted on a share of collateral revenue 
streams, such television revenues, in professional sports. In the movie industry, it has 
                                                 
92 Labor Relations in Professional Sports text following n.10. 
93 Labor Relations in Professional Sports text following n.10. 
94 See Richard A. Epstein, Stop the Football Merry-Go-Round, 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/72996. 
95  Vogel at 454 (Green Bay Packers in 2000). 
96  Vogel at 98. 
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been the employers who wanted to share revenue realized after employee performance 
was complete, in order to defer employee compensation payments. 
As new streams of revenue develop because of new Internet technologies,97 the struggle 
to allocate a share to employees will come from the employees, but it also may come 
from employers, to the extent that the effect is to shift total revenue from early to later 
periods of time. 
11. Stickiness of demand 
Professional sports differ from other entertainment industries in that professional sports 
teams have loyal followers, who can be counted on to attend games and watch games 
on television. In the theatre, movie, and popular music industries, by contrast, each new 
product offering is completely speculative: most of the costs must be incurred in 
advance, to rehearse a play, to shoot and edit a movie, or to record a song or an album, 
with no assurance that any significant number of consumers will pay to see it or hear it. 
12. Financing 
The relative importance of capital investment and operating costs differ sharply among 
the industries. In professional sports, operating costs for each season are large in 
comparison with upfront capital costs. At the opposite end of the spectrum, capital 
costs dwarf operating costs in the movie and popular music industries. Theatre falls 
somewhere in between.  
Theatre differs from professional sports, popular music, and movies in that it receives 
most of its funding from subsidies or charitable contributions.98 
13. Attitude toward collective bargaining 
In most industries, employers fight ferociously to avoid unionization and regulation of 
their workplaces through collective bargaining. Unions fight equally ferociously to 
maintain unionization and collective bargaining. In professional sports, employers want 
collective bargaining to shield them from antitrust liability. The employees sometimes 
                                                 
97  See § ___. 
98  The non-profit theatre segment of the industry, comprising mainly off-Broadway and regional theatres 
earned $811 million in revenue in 2009. Vogel at 497 n.7. Contributions exceeded revenue, comprising 
$969 million, or 54%. Id. Broadway shows earned $939 million from Broadway productions in 2007, and 
$950 from road shows, often performed by regional producers. Vogel at 482. 
33 
 
oppose collective bargaining when they think they can gain more from antitrust 
litigation. 
In theatre, producers perceive that Equity productions have higher credibility, and that 
Equity actors are better than non-Equity actors. These perceptions mute the incentive to 
remain non-union for cost and flexibility reasons. 
14. Defining the boundary between product and labor markets 
Any analysis of the interaction between antitrust and labor law strains to distinguish 
product markets from labor markets. Antitrust law focuses on product markets, while 
labor law focuses on labor markets. But the two markets are intertwined. That is why it 
so difficult to define the boundaries of the labor exemptions to the antitrust laws. Labor 
costs must be reflected in the prices for products and services, and so better 
employment terms tend to reduce demand in product markets. Conversely, reduced 
revenues in an employer’s product market diminish the resources available to improve 
workplace conditions and employee compensation. So an employer’s product market 
strategy legitimately is concerned with labor market developments, while employees 
and their representatives are legitimately concerned with product market 
developments. 
Analysis of the boundaries between the two markets must consider issues such as: 
 Use of contracts rather than integration within the firm. 
 Continued employment versus project-by-project employment. 
 Horizontal interdependency—whether firm success depends on interaction with 
competitors.  (The Chicago Bears are more profitable when they can play teams 
like the Green Bay Packers but the attractiveness of Steppenwolf’s plays do not 
depend on what Goodman is putting up). 
 Need for vertical integration: high in entertainment (Schubert; CBS; CAMU; 
Paramount Pictures); low in sports. 
 Whether employees work at multiple levels: sports players also functioning as 
coaches; actors directing plays or movies; writers acting, directing, or producing. 
 Whether independent contractors are firms or individuals. 
15. Sources of controversy 
The reasons for friction between antitrust and labor law differs between sports and 
other forms of entertainment. In sports, producing a good product requires limits on 
competition so that the best teams do not drive out the bad. Labor law is used 
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essentially as a shield for these limits, but it also comes into play because so much of the 
competition between teams is driven by whom they have on their rosters. 
In music, theatre, and movies, the friction occurs because the talent often performs 
entrepreneurial functions, and, conversely, entrepreneurial activities represent 
competition to the labor market for talent. It is difficult to say when a rock band is 
acting in its business capacity and when the members are participating in a labor 
market. In low-budget moviemaking, the producer is often indistinguishable from the 
director or cinematographer, who often are the actors as well. As technology fuels the 
DIY99 phenomenon, this conflation of roles becomes more prominent. 
B. College sports--the enigma 
College sports are an anomaly in the entertainment industry. Big-time college football, 
for example, is nearly indistinguishable from professional football. Revenue from 
broadcast of games rivals revenue from broadcast of NFL games. NFL teams recruit 
almost exclusively from the ranks of college football players. Yet college athletes are not 
considered employees, and therefore fall completely outside the labor exemptions. 
Nevertheless, tight restrictions that the NCAA imposes on competition mostly have 
escaped antitrust liability. 
 “The NCAA’s real role is to oversee the collusion of university athletic departments, 
whose goal is to maximize revenue and suppress the wages of its captive labor force.”100 
"Judicial opinions examining antitrust claims against NCAA rules are even more 
confused than decisions involving the intraleague rules of professional leagues."101 A 
                                                 
99  Do It Yourself. 
100 Joe Nocera, The College Sports Cartel, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2011 at p.A21 (arguing in favor of an 
antitrust challenge to NCAA). See also Lawrence M. Kahn, Cartel Behavior and Amateurism in College 
Sports, 21 J. Econ. Perspectives 209, 211 (2007) (arguing that NCAA is a classic cartel, enforcing collusive 
restrictions on payments for factors of production, including player compensation, on output, and on 
potential competitors); Peter Kreher, Antitrust Theory, College Sports, and Interleague Rulemaking: A 
New Critique of the NCAA's Amateurism Rules, 6 Va. Sports & Ent. L. J. 51 (2006) [hereinafter "Kreher"] 
(arguing that "NCAA's amateurism rules, which prevent players from being paid and impose restraints 
on their ability to move between schools, violate the antitrust laws because they function as collusive 
agreements between competing college sports leagues that limit consumer choice and lower product 
quality"); GET See also Robert Brown Journal of Sports Economics (2011). 
101  Kreher, 6 Va. Sports & Ent. L. J. at 76. 
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number of commentators argue that college players should be entitled to engage in 
collective bargaining.102 
In NCAA v. Board of Regents,103 analyzed more fully infra in section ___, the Supreme 
Court found that the NCAA plays a vital role in preserving the competitive character of 
college football, broadening consumer choice and the options available to athletes.104 
Nevertheless it found these pro-competitive effects insufficient, under the Sherman Act, 
to offset the anti-competitive effects of NCAA rules limiting television broadcasts of 
games. 105  
Most of the antitrust challenges to NCAA restrictions have foundered on the 
proposition, usually accepted by the courts, that college athletics does not involve 
commercial product or labor markets. In 2011, a district court dismissed an antitrust 
class action challenging the NCAA's bylaws prohibiting NCAA members from offering 
multi-year athletic scholarships and imposing a cap on the number of athletic-based 
discounts a school can offer per sport each year.106 The district court relied on  Banks v. 
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,107 in which the Seventh Circuit  affirmed a district court's 
decision to grant the NCAA's motion to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint regarding the 
no-agent and no-draft rules.108 At issue in Banks were rules prohibiting college athletes 
from participating in intercollegiate sports if they agreed to be represented by an agent 
or asked to be placed on the draft list of a professional league.109 The district court in 
                                                 
102  See Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCornick, The Myth of the Student Athlete: The College 
Athlete as Employee, 81 Washington L. Rev. 71 (2006) (arguing that college athletes are employees under 
traditional tests under NLRA); Rohith A. Parasuraman, Unionizing Division I Athletics: A Viable 
Solution? 57 Duke L. J. 727 (2007). 
103  468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
104  468 U.S. at 101-102. 
105  468 U.S. at 103-104 (distinguishing per-se from rule-of-reason analysis). 
106 Agnew v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 1:11-cv-0293-JMS-MJD, 2011 WL 3878200 (S.D. Ind. 
Sep. 1, 2011). 
107  977 F.2d 1081, 1085–86, 1094 (7th Cir.1992). 
108  977 F.2d at 1081. 
109 Id. at 1083–84. 
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Agnew found that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded that the geographic market 
was the entire United States,110 but failed to plead relevant product markets. The 
complaint alleged that two product markets were relevant: the market for the sale of 
bachelor's degrees and the labor market for the purchase of student athlete services.111 
The court rejected the labor market allegation because Banks rejected the idea that 
NCAA member schools could be purchasers of labor because the NCAA eligibility and 
recruiting requirements prohibit member colleges from engaging in price competition 
for players.112 It rejected the product-market allegations because "because people cannot 
simply purchase bachelor's degrees at Division I colleges and universities. 
Notwithstanding pop culture lyrics to the contrary, you can't just mess around and get 
a college degree. Instead, earning a bachelor's degree requires the student to attend 
class, take required courses, and maintain certain grades, among many other things."113 
The conclusion with respect to the product market allegations is plausible, but the 
conclusion with respect to the alleged labor market is tautological. The reasoning would 
defeat any Sherman Act claim in which a cartel is effective in prohibiting competition. 
In Gaines v. National Collegiate Athletic Association114 the district court denied a 
preliminary injunction against NCAA denial of eligibility to a former college football 
player because he participated in the NFL draft. The court held that the NCAA's 
eligibility rules (as distinct from other NCAA activities) were not subject to the antitrust 
laws because they were not commercial activities.115 It also held that even if those 
NCAA activities were subject to antitrust scrutiny they would be privileged under rule 
of reason analysis because they have the socially beneficial effect of preserving 
amateurism in college sports.116 It embraced the district court’s decision in Banks.  
                                                 
110 Id. at *6. 
111 Id. at *6. 
112 Id. *7 (quoting Banks, 977 F.2d at 1091). 
113 Id. at *8 [internal quotations and citations omitted]. 
114  , 746 F.Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990), 
115   746 F.Supp. at 744. 
116   746 F.Supp. at 746-747. 
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In Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,117 the Sixth Circuit affirmed 
dismissal of a Sherman Act claim by a former football coach who challenged NCAA 
recruiting rules. The plaintiff coach alleged a group boycott to prevent him from 
coaching at NCAA member schools: “The restraint at issue here is NCAA's boycott of 
coaches unjustly or excessively punished because of its disciplinary system. These bans 
affect interstate commerce by preventing schools across America from hiring boycotted 
coaches to generate sports revenue and by preventing these coaches from seeking 
gainful employment with NCAA institutions.”118 The court began with the proposition 
that a commercial activity must be implicated in order for the Sherman Act to apply:119 
"NCAA's rules on recruiting student athletes, specifically those rules prohibiting 
improper inducements and academic fraud, are all explicitly non-commercial . . . and 
designed to promote and ensure competitiveness amongst NCAA member schools."120    
In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation,121 a class action later dismissed for 
failure to satisfy class-action standards,122 the district court denied a motion to dismiss 
antitrust claims against NCAA scholarship restrictions. The NCAA argued that the 
plaintiffs "failed to allege a legally cognizable relevant market because there is no 
‘commercial’ or ‘employment market’ for the services of Division I-A football players, 
and because Plaintiffs fail to define or identify consumer substitutability, 
interchangeability, or cross-elasticity of demand."123  
The court reasoned: 
"By-law 15.5.5 does not clearly implicate student-athlete eligibility in the same manner 
as rules requiring students to attend class and rules revoking eligibility for entering a 
                                                 
117  528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008). 
118  528 F.3d at 431 (quoting plaintiff's brief). 
119  528 F.3d at 433. 
120  528 F.3d at 433. 
121  398 F. Supp.2d 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2005). 
122 In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation, No. C04-1254C, 2006 WL 1207915 (W.D. Wash. 
May 3, 2006) (denying motion to certify class). 
123  398 F. Supp.2d at 1150 (characterizing NCAA argument on motion to dismiss). 
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professional draft. . . . [They] were developed to contain costs, not to advance 
amateurism. Accordingly, the numerical scholarship limitation at issue in this case is 
not on all fours with those cases which hold that NCAA eligibility rules are not subject 
to the Sherman Act."124 
It also found that the plaintiffs alleged a sufficient market, one in which NCAA member 
schools compete for skilled amateur football players as necessary inputs to the 
production of Division I football.125 "The market alleged here is a monopsony. Injury to 
competition can occur by monopsony just as it may result from monopoly. "126 
In Agnew v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,127 the Seventh Circuit also recognized 
reality—a commercial labor market does exist for the services of college athletes: 
"The proper identification of a labor market for student-athletes, on the other hand, 
would meet plaintiffs' burden of describing a cognizable market under the Sherman 
Act. As an initial matter, labor markets are cognizable under the Sherman Act. The 
Banks majority, in dicta, opined that the market for scholarship athletes cannot be 
considered a labor market, since schools do not engage in price competition for players, 
nor does supply and demand determine the worth of student-athletes' labor. We find 
this argument unconvincing for two reasons. First, the only reason that colleges do not 
engage in price competition for student-athletes is that other NCAA bylaws prevent 
them from doing so. The fact that certain procompetitive, legitimate trade restrictions 
exist in a given industry does not remove that industry from the purview of the 
Sherman Act altogether. Rather, all NCAA actions that are facially anticompetitive must 
have procompetitive justifications supporting their existence. Second, colleges do, in 
fact, compete for student-athletes, though the price they pay involves in-kind benefits as 
opposed to cash. For instance, colleges may compete to hire the coach that will be best 
able to launch players from the NCAA to the National Football League, an attractive 
component for a prospective college football player. Colleges also engage in veritable 
arms races to provide top-of-the-line training facilities which, in turn, are supposed to 
                                                 
124  398 F. Supp.2d at 1149-1150. 
125   398 F. Supp.2d at 1150 [internal quotations and citations omitted]. 
126   398 F. Supp.2d at 1151. 
127   ___ F.3d ___, No. 11-3066, 2012 WL 2248509 at *11 (7th Cir. June 18, 2012) (affirming dismissal of 
Sherman Act suit challenging limitation on athletic scholarships) 
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attract collegiate athletes. Many future student-athletes also look to the strength of a 
college's academic programs in deciding where to attend. These are all part of the 
competitive market to attract student-athletes whose athletic labor can result in many 
benefits for a college, including economic gain."128  
It affirmed dismissal of a Sherman Act complaint, however, challenging NCAA 
restrictions on athletic scholarships, which it found not clearly pro-competitive, unlike 
NCAA eligibility restrictions. The plaintiffs unaccountably had failed to allege existence 
of the market. 
Although universities hate the idea of collective bargaining for their athletes because it 
would increase costs and diminish control, ironically it would offer them broader 
protection against antitrust liability. 
IV. Analytical approach 
A. Antitrust generally 
1. The antitrust laws 
The goal of antitrust law is to enhance consumer welfare by ensuring that competition 
regulates markets:129  
“The Sherman Act . . . rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of 
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest 
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time 
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political 
and social institutions.”130  
                                                 
128  Agnew at *15 hn 19, 20 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 
129  Compare MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 708 F.3d 1081, 1113 (7th Cir. 
1983) ("antitrust laws are designed to encourage vigorous competition, as well as to promote economic 
efficiency and maximize consumer welfare") with Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War 
with Itself (1978) 7, 9 (arguing that antitrust's basic premises are mutually incompatible because some of 
its doctrines preserve competition, while others suppress it). 
130  National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.27 
(quoting Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958)). 
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The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits horizontal agreements (agreements among 
competitors) that restrain trade and more narrowly prohibits unilateral action that 
threatens monopolization. Section 1 of the Sherman Act,131 prohibits contracts that 
restrain trade or commerce. Section 2 132 prohibits monopolization of trade or commerce. 
The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimination likely to lessen competition 
unless price differences are justified by differing costs. 133 The Clayton Act prohibits 
acquisition of another enterprise when it may "substantially" lessen competition or tend 
to create a monopoly.134 Labor organizations and their "lawful" conduct in carrying out 
their "legitimate objects" are immunized from these prohibitions.135 
Section one treats concerted activity more strictly than section two treats unilateral 
activity because concerted activity deprives the marketplace of independent centers of 
decisionmaking. Restricting it leaves untouched vast arenas for private economic 
decisions.136 In the years after enactment of the Sherman Act in 1884, judicial decisions 
interpreting the law drew distinctions between agreements among competitors 
(“horizontal agreements”) and agreements among firms providing inputs and 
consuming outputs of either other’s production activities (“vertical agreements”),  and 
crafted two tests for determining illegality under the Act: a per se test for the most 
egregious restraints such as naked price fixing or output restrictions and a more flexible 
rule of reason test for agreements that have both anti-competitive and pro-competitive 
effects. 
Monopolization is different from market dominance. "Simply possessing monopoly 
power and charging monopoly prices does not violate § 2; rather, the statute targets the 
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or 
                                                 
131   15 U.S.C. § 1. 
132  15 U.S.C. § 2. 
133  15 U.S.C.§ 13 (derived from § 1 of Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526). 
134   15 U.S.C. § 18 (derived from § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914). 
135   15 U.S.C. § 17 (§ 6 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731). 
136 American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (2010) (holding that 
National Football League was not a single entity and that agreements among teams to restrict distribution 
of sports paraphernalia violated section 1) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.”137 
"The law directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but 
against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself. It does so not out of 
solicitude for private concerns but out of concern for the public interest. Thus, this 
Court and other courts have been careful to avoid constructions of § 2 which might chill 
competition, rather than foster it. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust 
competition from conduct with long-term anticompetitive effects; moreover, single-firm 
activity is unlike concerted activity covered by § 1, which inherently is fraught with 
anticompetitive risk. For these reasons, § 2 makes the conduct of a single firm unlawful 
only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens to do so, . . . [necessitating] 
inquiry into the relevant product and geographic market and the defendant's economic 
power in that market."138 
2. Rule of reason 
Even if a labor exemption does not apply, the restrictions on competition nevertheless 
may be justified under rule-of-reason analysis. When anti-competitive measures involve 
an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is 
to be available at all, careful definition of relevant markets and analysis of the dynamics 
in those markets is necessary under the rule of reason.139 
The rule of reason recognizes that "a restraint in a limited aspect of a market may 
actually enhance marketwide competition."140 Both the per se rule and the rule of reason 
are employed “to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the 
restraint.”141 In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of 
                                                 
137  Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 448 (2009) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
138 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1993). 
139  National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)  
(rejecting per se treatment of horizontal price fixing in market for college football game broadcasts, but 
finding that anti-competitive effects outweighed pro-competitive effects). 
140   468 U.S. at 103. 
141   468 U.S. at 103. 
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University of Oklahoma,142 the Supreme Court observed that the antitrust laws prohibit 
only unreasonable restraints of trade, since "every contract is a restraint of trade."143 
Although horizontal price fixing and restraints on output, such as those contained in 
the plan, typically are unreasonable as a matter of law, under the per-se approach, the 
Court found that rule of reason rather than per se analysis was appropriate because 
collegiate football is "an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are 
essential if the product is to be available at all."144 "The NCAA plays a vital role in 
enabling college football to preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to be 
marketed which might otherwise be unavailable. In performing this role, its actions 
widen consumer choice—not only the choices available to sports fans but also  those 
available to athletes—and hence can be viewed as procompetitive."145  
Because the NCAA television plan on its face restrained the operation of a free market, 
the antitrust defendants had the burden of establishing a pro-competitive justification.146 
The majority found that no procompetitive efficiencies existed to justify the restrictions; 
NCAA football could be marketed just as efficiently without the television plan.147 Nor 
was the plan necessary to enable the NCAA to penetrate the market, because college 
football broadcasts "constitute a unique product for which there is no ready 
substitute."148 Nor did it effectively protect the market for attendance at live football 
games.149 Significantly, it held that “The Rule of Reason does not support a defense 
based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable.”150 "The NCAA's 
argument that its television plan is necessary to protect live attendance is not based on a 
desire to maintain the integrity of college football as a distinct and attractive product, 
                                                 
142   468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
143   468 U.S. at 98. 
144   468 U.S. at 100. 
145   468 U.S. at 101-102 [internal quotations and citations omitted]. 
146   468 U.S. at 113. 
147   468 U.S. at 114. 
148   468 U.S. at 115. 
149   468 U.S. at 115-116. 
150   468 U.S. at 117 [internal quotation and citation omitted]. 
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but rather on a fear that the product will not prove sufficiently attractive to draw live 
attendance when faced with competition from televised games. At bottom the NCAA's 
position is that ticket sales for most college games are unable to compete in a free 
market. The television plan protects ticket sales by limiting output—just as any 
monopolist increases revenues by reducing output. By seeking to insulate live ticket 
sales from the full spectrum of competition because of its assumption that the product 
itself is insufficiently attractive to consumers, petitioner forwards a justification that is 
inconsistent with the basic policy of the Sherman Act."151 It recognized pro-competitive 
legitimacy of the goal of maintaining a competitive balance among amateur athletic 
teams, but found that the plan did not promote that goal. 152 
The dissenters153 questioned the majority's assessment of anti-competitive effect,154 and 
argued that the plan’s positive effect on the NCAA's fundamental goal of preserving 
amateurism and integrating athletic and education155 were “sufficient to offset any 
minimal anticompetitive effects . . . ."156 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,157 also illustrates rule of 
reason analysis, but it came out the other way, validating a collective licensing system 
for musical works. The court of appeals, disagreeing with the district court, held that 
the blanket licenses, which uniformly charged fees based on a percentage of total 
revenue or a flat fee constituted price fixing, a per se violation of the Sherman Act. The 
Supreme Court disagreed, finding per se treatment inappropriate, in significant part 
because the courts lacked experience with arrangements of the sort being challenged.158 
It found pro-competitive effects because of the impracticability of direct licensing by 
                                                 
151   468 U.S. at 116-117. 
152  468 U.S. at 117-118. 
153   468 U.S. at 120 (White, Rehnquist, JJ, dissenting). 
154   468 U.S. at 130-131. 
155   468 U.S. at 124. 
156   468 U.S. at 136. 
157   441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
158    441 U.S. at 10. 
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thousands of copyright owners, thousands of users, and millions of compositions. The 
costs would be prohibitive without blanket licenses. Furthermore the challenged 
arrangement was not a naked restraint of trade; it was accompanied by "accompanies 
the integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright 
use."159  
Justice Stevens agreed that rule of reason analysis was appropriate rather than per see 
illegality, but he dissented on the outcome of the majority's rule of reason analysis.160 
Noting that a practice that might be permissible for a small vendor may become illegal 
when employed by a dominant firm, because of its greater impact on competition in the 
latter case,161 he concluded that the anti-competitive effects of the challenged 
arrangement outweighed its pro-competitive effects, in large part by identifying less 
anti-competitive alternatives such as negotiation of music-performing rights on a per-
composition or per-use basis, either with the composer or publisher directly or with an 
agent such as ASCAP."162  
He cautioned that antitrust policy requires close scrutiny of great aggregations of 
economic power, especially when the aggregation is based on statutory monopolies 
such as copyright.163 That of course is precisely the starting point for many of the 
restrictions on competition in entertainment markets.  
B. Labor law 
1. Collective bargaining 
Collective bargaining is intended to result in private agreements to restrain competition 
in labor markets. The most traditional trade union objective is to restrict the supply of 
labor—to establish a monopoly in the labor market.164 Union security clauses such as 
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closed-shop agreements and union-shop agreements are means used to achieve that 
objective with respect to the employer covered by the agreement: that employer cannot 
employ anyone who is not already a member of the union (a closed shop agreement), or 
anyone hired by the employer must become and remain a member of the union as a 
condition of continued employment (a union shop agreement). That gives the union a 
monopoly on the labor supply for that particular employer.165 
Almost as common an objective in a traditional unionized industry is the objective of 
restricting the demand for labor—to establish a monopsony in the relevant labor 
market.166 The union ensures that no employer will employ any worker who is not 
represented by the union—or to divorce the monopsony concept from the monopoly 
concept—to ensure that no employer employs anyone under terms less favorable than 
the union-negotiated terms.  
At the pole, a union may seek the establishment of a product market cartel with input 
restrictions, so that the product markets for unionized employers are protected from 
non-union competition.167 
A variety of means can be used to pursue these objectives. The union can withdraw 
labor (a strike); it can publicize the conduct of a recalcitrant employer by picketing 
and/or other forms of publicity,168 it can cause other firms that supply factors of 
production or that purchase products or services to withhold their patronage.169 The 
availability of all of these means depends on the union having a beachhead from which 
to extend the pressure: a group of employees already represented by the union who 
have enough solidarity to make the sacrifice in wages involved in a strike or to incur the 
opportunity cost and other costs of picketing or publicizing a dispute.  
                                                 
165  The agreement may cover only certain crafts or classes of work, in which case the agreement gives the 
union a monopoly on the supply of that particular kind of labor. 
166  Cf. Campbell, 38 Stanford L. Rev. at 2022, 1040 (recognizing legitimacy of union efforts to seek anti-
competitive arrangements to assure demand for labor). 
167  See Campbell, 38 Stanford L. Rev. at 1047 (noting labor law's suspicion of union efforts to help create 
product market cartels, even though it helps protect union standards). 
168  Area standards picketing, privileged by 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7), is an example. 
169  This is a secondary boycott, restricted by 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). 
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2. Economic weapons 
Negotiation involves leverage. Rational negotiators accept any negotiated solution that 
is better than their BATNAs.170 Various weapons exist to influence an adversary’s 
BATNA. In traditional collective bargaining the paradigm is a strike, a lockout, or 
unilateral imposition by the employer of new terms and conditions of employment. 
In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,171 the Supreme Court held that unilateral imposition of a 
fixed salary for developmental football players after an impasse in collective bargaining 
fell within the non-statutory labor exemption. The Court considered the issue to be: 
whether the exemption "appl[ies] to an agreement among several employers bargaining 
together to implement after impasse the terms of their last best good-faith wage 
offer."172 It noted that unilateral implementation of proposed terms of employment after 
an impasse in multiemployer bargaining was a "familiar practice" in multiemployer 
bargaining, as well as in single employer bargaining.173 It concluded that the non-
statutory exemption applied.174 
A more recent case, probably decided incorrectly, is California ex rel Harris v. Safeway, 
Inc.175 It involved a mutual strike assistance agreement (the “RSP”) among California 
grocery-store chains. Under the agreement, any grocer that earned revenues above its 
historical share relative to the other chains during strike or lockout period would pay 
15% of those excess revenues as reimbursement to the other grocers to restore their pre-
strike shares.176 The agreement was intended to ameliorate the effects of a selective 
                                                 
170  See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., ___ F. Supp.2d ___, Case No. 07-CV-2000 H(CAB), 
2011 WL 5513225 at n.4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2011) (characterizing BATNA theory as well-accepted); Henry 
H. Perritt, Jr. Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the 
Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 Geo. L. J. 1625, 1637 (1986) (explaining BATNA 
concept). 
171  518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
172   518 U.S. at 238. 
173  518 U.S. at 239-240. 
174  518 U.S. at 250. 
175  651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) 
176 Id. at 1123. 
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strike, also known as "whipsawing." The grocers argued that the non-statutory 
exemption immunizes employers agreements related in time and circumstance to the 
collective-bargaining process, and that the economic weapons parties use to advance 
their positions in a labor dispute—like an agreement to share revenue to weaken the 
effects of a whipsaw strike—are ‘as much a part of the collective bargaining process as 
are negotiations over terms.’”177 The en banc court of appeals rejected the argument, 
finding no body of regulatory or judicial decisions that establishes employer revenue 
sharing as an "an accepted economic weapon during a labor dispute."178 The court also 
noted that the challenged agreement primarily affected the product market, while most 
of the non-statutory labor exemption cases involved employer activity primarily 
directed at the labor market.179  
The decision is wrong because the mutual assistance pact concerned collective 
bargaining; its only purpose was to enhance employer bargaining power by reducing 
the injury that could be inflicted by a strike or lockout. The dissent pointed to a number 
of NLRB and courts cases validating a variety of economic weapons to combat whipsaw 
strike tactics, strike insurance provided by unions, employer strike insurance plans, and 
in Air Line Pilots Ass'n International v. Civil Aeronautics Board.,180 , an employer mutual 
aid pact containing a provision "almost identical to the RSP" at issue in the Harris case.181  
In Air Line Pilots Ass'n Intern. v. CAB,182 cited by dissenting circuit judge Kozinski in 
Harris, airline unions challenged the Civil Aeronautics Board approval of a mutual aid 
pact entered into by airlines. The pact provided for strike payments A strikebound 
company received payments from other Pact members equal to their increase in 
revenues resulting from the strike minus their added operating expenses in servicing 
the new business.183 Upholding the pact, the court reasoned that "The national labor 
                                                 
177 Id. at 1128 (summarizing employer position). 
178 Id. at 1129. 
179 Id. at 1131. 
180  502 F.2d 453 (D.C.Cir.1974) 
181 Id. at *17, *19 (Kozinski, C.J.  dissenting). 
182  502 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
183  502 F.2d at 456. 
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policy rests on the principle that parties should be free to marshal the economic 
resources at their disposal in the resolution of a labor dispute, consistent with the 
specific rights and prohibitions established by the labor statutes."184 It aligned itself with 
the Second Circuit, which, in Kennedy v. Long Island Railroad Co..,185 approved an 
employer strike insurance plan in the railroad industry.186 
3. The labor exemptions to the antitrust laws—in general 
Much of the history of collective bargaining in professional football was shaped by the 
statutory and non-statutory exemptions to the antitrust laws. These exemptions 
similarly determine the scope of permissible workplace regulations in all sectors of the 
entertainment industry. 
a) The labor laws 
The labor laws comprise the Norris-LaGuardia Act,187  which divests federal courts of 
jurisdiction to issue injunctions in “labor disputes,” the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”),188 The Labor Management Relations Act,189 the Norris La-Guardia Act,190 and 
the Railway Labor Act.191 Section 7 of the NLRA192 and section 2 of the Railway Labor 
Act193 grant broad rights to employees to engage in collective bargaining through 
representatives of their choice. Means and ends in collective bargaining are not 
                                                 
184  502 F.2d at *456. 
185  319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1963), 
186  319 F.2d at 374. 
187  29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115. 
188  29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169. 
189  29 U.S.C. §§ 171-183. 
190  29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115. 
191  45 U.S.C.  §§ 151-188. 
192  29 U.S.C. § 157. 
193  45 U.S.C. § 152. 
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unlimited in scope, however. Labor law restricts use of these weapons, but only when 
they are used by union actors.194 
A number of other statutes regulate aspects of the employment relationship, but the 
ones named here provide the basic statutory framework for collective bargaining, which 
is the core of the labor exemption. 
b) Statutory exemption 
A "statutory" labor exemption, derived from the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act shields labor unions from antitrust liability.195 Without the exemption, labor unions 
would be a paradigmatic combination to fix wages. When labor unions enter into 
agreements with others such as employers, however, they are outside the statutory 
exemption.196 
c) Non-statutory exemption 
Agreements among businessmen are subject to the antitrust laws. Columbia River 
Packers Ass'n v. Hinton,197 involved a suit for an injunction brought by a fish-packing 
enterprise, claiming that the defendants violated the Sherman Act. The defendant, 
styling itself the "Pacific Coast Fishermen's Union,” actually was a fishermen's 
association. The fishermen owned or leased fishing boats, and carried on their business 
as independent entrepreneurs.198 The "union" acted as an agent for sale of fish caught by 
its members. It prohibited members from selling fish outside of the agreement, and 
prohibited purchasers from purchasing fish from nonmembers.199  
The court of appeals, reversing the district court, held that the Norris-LaGuardia act 
foreclosed an injunction, because a labor dispute was involved. The Supreme Court 
                                                 
194  The chapeau to 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(b) says, "(b) Unfair labor practices by labor organization. 
“It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—" 
195  H. A. Artists & Associates, Inc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 715  (1981). 
196   451 U.S. at 715. 
197   315 U.S. 143 (1942). 
198   315 U.S. at 144-145. 
199   315 U.S. at 145. 
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reversed, concluding that "a dispute among businessmen over the terms of a contract 
for the sale of fish" is different from "controversy concerning terms or conditions of 
employment, or concerning the association of persons seeking to arrange terms or 
conditions of employment."200 The Norris-LaGuardia Act applies, the Court held, only 
when "the employer-employee relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy."201  
"The controversy here is altogether between fish sellers and fish buyers. The sellers are 
not employees of the petitioners or of any other employer nor do they seek to be. On the 
contrary, their desire is to continue to operate as independent businessmen, free from 
such controls as an employer might exercise."202 
Nevertheless union agreements with non-union parties may be within a "nonstatutory" 
exemption if the agreement is "intimately related to the union's vital concerns of wages, 
hours, and working conditions."203 The non-statutory exemption is necessary because 
the statutory exemption does not exempt concerted action by non-labor parties or 
agreements between labor unions and non-labor parties.204  
The early cases recognized this non-statutory exemption but found it to be inapplicable. 
“The Supreme Court has never delineated the precise boundaries of the [non-statutory 
labor] exemption, and what guidance it has given as to its application has come mostly 
in cases in which agreements between an employer and a labor union were alleged to 
have injured or eliminated a competitor in the employer's business or product 
market.”205 
The Court first addressed the non-statutory labor exemption in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 
Union No. 3. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,206 involving a series of 
agreements between an electrical workers union and several manufacturers and 
                                                 
200   315 U.S. at 145. 
201   315 U.S. at 147. 
202   315 U.S. at 147. 
203  H. A. Artists & Associates, Inc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 716 (1981). 
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contractors in which the manufacturers and contractors agreed not to do business with 
non-union firms.  Congress did not intend to bestow on unions “complete and 
unreviewable authority to aid business groups to frustrate [antitrust legislation's] 
primary objective.”207 
In United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington208 the Supreme Court similarly declined 
to apply the exemption to insulate a wage agreement between a union of mine workers 
and large coal companies.  There were, the Court explained, “limits to what a union or 
an employer may offer or extract in the name of wages,”209 Measures adopted with the 
purpose of eliminating smaller coal companies and permitting larger companies to 
control the market were outside those limits.210 “[A] union forfeits its exemption from 
the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it has agreed with one set of employers 
to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units.”211 The Court held that the 
challenged agreement was not exempt from the antitrust laws.212 
The leading early case finding that conduct fell within the exemption is Local Union No. 
189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America v. Jewel Tea Co.213 The 
union representing butchers in Chicago reached a collective-bargaining agreement with 
a multi-employer bargaining unit of food retailers that included a marketing hours 
restriction, which prohibited the sale of meat before 9:00 a.m. and after 6:00 p.m., and 
on Sundays.214 The plurality opinion explained that “the marketing-hours restriction, 
like wages, and unlike prices, is so intimately related to wages, hours and working 
conditions that the unions' successful attempt to obtain that provision ... falls within the 
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protection of the national labor policy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman 
Act.”215  
The basic outlines of the non-statutory exemption were visible in these early cases: 
direct restrictions on product markets lay outside the exemption; indirect effects on 
product markets from terms closely related to wages and working conditions lay within 
the exemption. 
The term "nonstatutory" was first used by the Supreme Court in Connell Const. Co., Inc. 
v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100.216 In that case, the Court declined to 
apply the non-statutory exemption to a union-employer agreement. 217A building trades 
union entered into a multi-employer bargaining agreement with a large group of 
mechanical contractors.218 The union asked Connell Construction—a general building 
contractor that was outside the bargaining agreement and whose workers were not 
represented by the union—to agree to subcontract mechanical work only to firms 
covered by the multiemployer agreement.219 Connell initially refused to sign the 
agreement but acquiesced when the unions picketed one of its construction sites.220 The 
exemption did not shield the agreement from the antitrust laws because such a “direct 
restraint on the business market has substantial anticompetitive effects, both actual and 
potential, that would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition over 
wages and working conditions.”221 
Circuit Judge Harry Edwards said this about the non-statutory exemption: 
                                                 
215 381 at 689–90. 
216  421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975) (using term "nonstatutory exemption). 
217 421 U.S. at 621. 
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"one principle that seems clear: restraints on competition lawfully imposed through the 
collective bargaining process are exempted from antitrust liability so long as such 
restraints primarily affect only the labor market organized around the collective 
bargaining relationship."222 
"[T]here may be a ‘labor dispute’ where the disputants do not stand in the proximate 
relation of employer and employee. But the statutory classification, however broad, of 
parties and circumstances to which a labor dispute' may relate does not expand the 
application of the Act to include controversies upon which the employer-employee 
relationship has no bearing."223 
d) Congruence of labor exemption with scope of NLRA and 
Norris-LaGuardia 
The scope of a labor dispute under Norris-LaGuardia has the same boundaries as the 
labor exemption because the labor exemption is based on Norris-LaGuardia.224 
Likewise, the labor exemption should have the same boundaries as employee status 
under the NLRA, because otherwise the employees do not have the right to engage in 
collective bargaining. Promotion of collective bargaining is the labor policy that trumps 
antitrust policy. 
Judge Edwards derived two principles from the decided cases: 
"First, the exemption must be broad enough in scope to shield the entire collective 
bargaining process established by federal law. Second, the case for applying the 
exemption is strongest where a restraint on competition operates primarily in the labor 
market and has no anti-competitive effect on the product market."225 
There is no collective bargaining process to shield if the workers involved in a dispute 
are not statutory “employees” entitled to participate in it. Nevertheless, there may be 
                                                 
222 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
223  Conley Motor Express v. Russell,  500 F.2d 124, 126 (3d Cir. 1974). 
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some statutory non-employees who are so closely tied to a labor market in which 
collective bargaining operates that restrictions on their competition may be within the 
exemption.226  
"[N]ot all combinations of unions with entrepreneurs or independent contractors fall 
outside the statutory exemption. The second part of the Hutcheson requirement of 
unilateral conduct authorizes a broad interpretation of “labor group.” Even though a 
challenged combination includes independent contractors or entrepreneurs, it may 
come within the statutory exemption if the non-employee parties to the combination are 
in job or wage competition with the employee parties, or in some other economic 
interrelationship that substantially affects the legitimate interests of the employees."227  
There must be some statutory employees involved, however. 
"We recognize, of course, that, as a general matter, the antitrust laws may apply to 
restraints on competition in non-unionized labor markets. However, we think the 
inception of a collective bargaining relationship between employees and employers 
irrevocably alters the governing legal regime. Once employees organize a union, federal 
labor law necessarily limits the rights of individual employees to enter into negotiations 
with their employer. Indeed, employers are positively prohibited from seeking to 
bargain with individual employees, absent consent from the union. Moreover, 
employers may lawfully reduce competition in the labor market by forming multi-
employer bargaining units, allowing for standardization of wage rates and working 
conditions within an industry. Thus, once collective bargaining begins, the Sherman Act 
paradigm of a perfectly competitive market necessarily is replaced by the NLRA 
paradigm of organized negotiation—a paradigm that itself contemplates collusive 
activity on the parts of both employees and employers. Stubborn adherence to antitrust 
principles in such a market can only result in “a wholesale subversion” of federal labor 
policy."228 
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In Brady v. National Football League,229 however, the court of appeals accepted the parties' 
stipulation that "the Act's restrictions on equitable relief are not necessarily coextensive 
with the substantive rules of antitrust law . . . ."230 It held that a "labor dispute" may exist 
under Norris-LaGuardia even if no union exists.231 Rejecting the plaintiffs' argument 
that the Act only prohibits injunctions against unions and employees, it also held that a 
lockout is covered by the specific activities shielded from injunctions by the Act.232 
When either labor exemption applies, it is likely that the NLRB has primary jurisdiction, 
displacing the authority of the courts, to decide the merits of any dispute over 
interpretation of the labor laws.233 
e) Means and ends 
The extent of the labor exemptions depends on the objectives (ends) of the challenged 
arrangement and the means used to achieve them. The Clayton Act refers to lawful 
means to achieve legitimate objectives,234 in taking collective bargaining outside the 
scope of antitrust law. Analysis of these factors frequently overlaps assessment of the 
anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects in antitrust rule-of-reason analysis. 
f)  Coverage of independent contractors 
The general view is that independent contractors may not benefit from the labor 
exemption by banding together and calling themselves a labor union.235 In Allied 
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Chemical and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,236 the Supreme Court reviewed 
the evolution of the statutory definition of employee, noting that Congress had 
amended the statute explicitly to exclude "independent contractors," after the Supreme 
Court, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications,237 agreed with the NLRB that newspaper street 
vendors were statutory employees.238  
The prohibition is not absolute, however: 
"Even though a challenged combination includes independent contractors or 
entrepreneurs, it may come within the statutory exemption if the non-employee parties 
to the combination are in job or wage competition with the employee parties, or in some 
other economic interrelationship that substantially affects the legitimate interests of the 
employees.”239 
In Taylor v. Journeymen Horseshoers,240 the en banc Fourth Circuit, relying heavily on 
Columbia River Packers, reversed the district court and held that farriers (workers that 
shoe horses) were independent contractors and therefore outside the labor exemption. 
The case arose when a union representing Maryland farriers insisted that trainers and 
owners of race horses use only union farriers and further threatened to expel any union 
member who worked for less that union scale. The court of appeals found that the non-
union farriers were independent contractors because they set their own working hours, 
because they worked for more than one trainer and owner, and because the trainers and 
owners did not concern themselves with how the task of shoeing a horse was 
accomplished but only with the end result.241 Their status as independent contractors 
led to the conclusion that no labor dispute was involved, and therefore that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and the labor exemption did not foreclose an injunction again the 
violation of the Sherman Act.  
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"The only interests sought to be advanced by the activities of these defendants are the 
interests of those independent horseshoers who render services to trainers and owners 
for a certain fee, unilaterally fixed, per horse. They are independent businessman, 
specialists in their line, who have banded together and who act in concert for their 
mutual benefit and improvement. We fail to discover the existence of any employer-
employee relationship which is the ‘Matrix’ of this controversy or any condition which, 
under the provisions of either the Clayton Act or the Norris-LaGuardia Act, would 
protect the activities of the defendants."242 
Circuit judges Sobeloff and Bell dissented,  
"The dispute between the farriers and the owners concerns the reward paid the farriers 
for their labor. The refusal to handle the Canadians' horses grows out of the latter's use 
of labor which undercut wage standards the union deemed fair. The defendants' 
conduct involves nothing more than the withholding of their labor in order to coerce 
the owners  to have all work performed under minimum union standards. Such a 
withholding of labor does not violate the antitrust laws. "243 
Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild,244 holding the free-lance directors were 
employees, discussed infra at § ___, distinguished Taylor. 
When no labor union and no statutory employees are involved at all, the non-statutory 
exemption is unavailable. Conley Motor Express, Inc. v. Russell,245 involved an 
association of owner-operator truck drivers that had been denied status as a labor union 
by the NLRB. The association picketed a trucking company that employed its members, 
seeing recognition as bargaining agent and obtained a more favorable financial 
arrangement. The existing arrangement paid the drivers a share of the fee that the 
trucking company received for hauling steel.246 The trucking company's legal theory 
was violation of the antitrust laws, a position that the truckers did not contest. The 
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argued that they were shielded from injunctive relief by Norris-LaGuardia.247 The court 
of appeals affirmed grant of a preliminary injunction against the picketing, finding that 
the primary prerequisite for exemption from the anti-trust laws was lacking, “i.e., that 
their dispute with Conley involves an employer-employee relationship."248 
Whether someone performing work is an employee or independent contractor is 
determined under the general common law of agency, which requires evaluation of the 
hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is 
accomplished, which involves analysis of the following factors: 
 the skill required;249 
 the source of the instrumentalities and tools;250 
 the location of the work;251 
 the duration of the relationship between the  parties;252 
 whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired 
party;253 
 the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work;254 
 the method of payment;255 
 the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;256 
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 whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;257 
 whether the hired party is in business;258 
 the provision of employee benefits;259 and  
 the tax treatment of the hired party.260  
In Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild of America, Inc.,261 HBO filed an antitrust action 
against an association of freelance directors. The directors defended based on the labor 
exemption. The district court decided that the statutory exemption applied. Its 
reasoning is especially pertinent to the subject of this article, because it emphasizes a 
trend of shifting work from traditional employees to freelance workers: 
"Several characteristics of freelance directors' activities tend to suggest that they are 
independent contractors in the sale of their services. Freelance directors may accept or 
reject offers to direct particular shows. They usually contract to work on an individual 
program rather than for a fixed period. Under Guild agreements, they are paid flat fees 
for work up to a certain number of days and may accept more than one assignment 
simultaneously from different employers. They have considerable discretion over who 
will serve as their assistants, particularly the associate director and technical crew; often 
these assistants work repeatedly with the same director. Freelance directors also have 
special skills, based on substantial training and experience. They necessarily have 
considerable discretion in exercising their skills, working closely with all the talent 
associated with a show, contributing creatively to all the elements of a show, and 
working to mold those elements into a coherent whole that has the “look” sought by the 
individual in charge of the production. A producer may specify the desired result, but 
the director usually decides initially how that result is to be achieved.”262 
                                                 
257 If it is  part of her regular business, then employee status is more likely. 
258 If the hired party is in business, independent contractor status is more likely. 
259 Payment of benefits such as health care insurance and pension benefits makes employee status more 
likely. 
260 See  Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-752 (1989) (applying common-
law test in copyright case; citing Restatement of Agency § 220(2)). 
261   531 F. Supp. 578, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), 
262  531 F. Supp. at 594. 
60 
 
Nevertheless, the court identified other characteristics of the labor market that 
suggested treatment as employees: Freelance directors risked no monetary capital in 
shows and did not share in any profits. They did not get paid for a defined output, 
instead receiving additional compensation for each additional day of work, 
reimbursement for their expenses, and fringe benefits. Many were treated as employees 
for tax purposes. They did not control either the time or place of their work.”263  
 These characteristics combined to drive the outcome of application of the right-to-
control test: 
“Freelance directors have no ‘“right to control’” the creative elements of shows they 
direct. Guild agreements expressly reserve to employers the power to supervise and 
control freelance directors. Producers have complete discretion in determining what 
revisions, deletions, or abridgements to make on directors' work product. . . . Where 
directors are left with substantial control and creative authority, it is because producers 
decide that such a policy is appropriate for the show involved or necessary to 
accommodate a particularly powerful director. Even famous, award-winning directors, 
however, are often closely supervised by their producers. 
“* * * 
“Thus, although freelance directors may independently contract for their work, once 
engaged they perform their tasks, albeit with skill and creativity, as employees.  
“* * * 
Relevant to the theme of this article, the court found that “the trend to freelance status 
for directors has not been the result solely of a desire by directors for greater creative 
independence. Rather, it is the product of many forces, and particularly . . . pressures to 
surrender control over programming, pressures that have led to the establishment of 
numerous independent production companies. These smaller entities have less need 
and capacity to retain full-time staff directors. Furthermore, the need for directorial 
services was reduced in all production entities by the advent of tape and other filming 
techniques; live television programming, which created a great need for directorial 
services, has now been substantially abandoned in many areas. The networks and 
production companies have retained full-time staff directors chiefly to work on 
                                                 
263  531 F. Supp. at 594-595. 
61 
 
programs produced on a regular basis, and they have reduced the number of such 
directors in large part because they need fewer full-timers.”264 
Even if the directors were not employees, “the similarity of functions and overlap of 
capacities among staff and freelance directors creates a mutuality of interest that readily 
justifies their bargaining collectively. If minimum wages or other conditions of 
employment differed materially for these two groups, the terms of employment enjoyed 
by the more advantaged group could well be affected by the availability of directorial 
services in the other group at lower prices. Staff and freelance directors are to a 
considerable extent interchangeable; indeed, employer decisions more than anything 
else determine throughout the industry whether a set of directors is staff or freelance. 
Thus, staff and freelance directors are in much stronger job competition than were the 
musicians and bandleaders in American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll, supra, 
which permitted a bargaining combination of the two groups."265 
In Julien v. Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers, Inc.,266 the district court 
determined that stage directors were entitled to labor exemption because they were 
employees. The producer exercised control over every aspect of work. One with 
experience in theatre might dispute the general validity of this assertion. In many 
productions, the director is the boss. 
In Ring v. Spina,267 the court determined that playwrights were not entitled to the labor 
exemption: 
"Here not only are the disputing parties not in an employer-employee relationship, but, 
unlike the Allen Bradley case, the controversy cannot concern itself with conditions of 
employment, since none of the parties affected are in any true sense employees. An 
author writing a book or play is usually not then even in any contractual relation with 
his producer. If and when he does contract, he does not continue in the producer's 
service to any appreciable or continuous extent thereafter. Normally the author appears 
more nearly like the fishermen entrepreneurs of the Hinton case or the doctors in the 
                                                 
264  531 F. Supp. at 596-597. 
265   531 F. Supp. at 595 -597 [internal quotations and citations omitted]. 
266 No. 68 Civ. 5120, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15839, 80 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P11,888 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 7, 1975) 
267   148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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American Medical Association case than workmen banded together in a union. The 
minimum price and royalties provided by the Basic Agreement, unlike minimum wages 
in a collective bargaining agreement, are not remuneration for continued services, but 
are the terms at which a finished product or certain rights therein may be sold. And no 
wages or working conditions of any group of employees are directly dependent on 
these terms. We think the exception therefore inapplicable."268 
This line of cases suggests the following rules of thumb for combinations involving 
persons nominally characterized as independent contractors: 
Some independent contractors are shielded by the labor exemption if they are 
substitutes for employees. Independent contractors who are truly independent, 
however, such as indie musicians, independent theatre companies or producers, or 
indie movie-makers enjoy no labor exemption. 
4. Statutory anti-competitive approaches—FLSA 
Even when collective bargaining does not operate, the federal Fair Labor Standards 
Act269 puts a floor under labor-market competition, by prohibiting employers from 
paying less than the minimum wage270 and by limiting the number of hours per week 
that employees may work without being paid a premium—usually time and a half their 
regular wage for hours worked in excess of forty.271 These limits on competition, 
however, are not comprehensive in scope. The Act excludes independent contractors; 
professionals and managers, in particular actors and writers; and students. 
The six-factor Silk test, discussed in sec. ___, is used to determine whether someone is a 
covered employee under the FLSA.272 Actors, even participants in reality television 
shows, usually qualify as employees rather than independent contractors.273 
                                                 
268   148 F.2d at 652. 
269   29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. 
270   29 U.S.C. § 206. 
271   29 U.S.C. § 207. 
272  Adam P. Greenberg, Reality's Kids: Are Children Who Partiicpate on Reality Television Shows 
Covered Under the Fair Labor Standards Act? 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 595, 612-617 (2009) [hereinafter 




a) FLSA exemption for actors, writers, and directors 
The FLSA exempts certain professional employees from the minimum wage and 
overtime provisions of the act.274 State labor standards regulation typically provides a 
similar exemption.275 Arguments persist, however, over when performers and writers 
perform sufficiently creative work to quality for the artist exemption.276  
b) Coverage of volunteers and students 
The effect of the FLSA in the entertainment industries is further limited because it does 
not cover most volunteers, thus exempting many participants in small-scale theatre and 
moviemaking. It also does not cover students, thus exempting college athletes.277 In 
                                                                                                                                                             
273  See Greenberg, 82 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 632-638 (working through each of the six factors). Mr. Greenberg's 
analysis of child actors in reality shows leads, a fortiori, to the conclusion that adult actors on scripted 
shows are employees, because they are subject to even great control by producers and directors. He 
admits however that involvement for less than a full season might cause the permanence-of-employment 
factor to militate against employee status. Greenberg, 82 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 644 (participating in only one 
episode is not permanent enough). 
274  See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1); 29 CFR § 541.302(c) (noting that actors generally meet the requirements of 
professional exemptions from FLSA) 
275  See Califonia INDUSTRIAL WELFARE COMMISSION ORDER NO. 10-2001 REGULATING WAGES, 
HOURS AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE AMUSEMENT AND RECREATION INDUSTRY, 
http://www.dir.ca.gov/IWC/IWCArticle10.pdf (requiring $8 per hour and time and a half for overtime). 
See id. sec. 2(A)(defining "amusement and recreation industry" to include theatres); sec. 1(A)(3)(b)(ii) 
(exempting original and creative work in a recognized field of artistic endeavor, to be construed pursuant 
to 29 C.F.R. Sections 541.207, 541.301(a)-(d), 541.302, 541.306, 541.307, 541.308, and 541.310) 
276  See Alexis Miller, Reality Check for Production Companies: Why Writers on Reality Television Are 
Entitled to Overtime Pay, 27 Loy. L. A. Ent. L. Rev. 185 (2006-2007) (arguing that reality telvision writers 
are not sufficiently creative to quality for the FLSA artist exemption; also reviewing possibility of 
representation by Writers Guild); Adam P. Greenberg, Reality's Kids: Are Children Who Partiicpate on 
Reality Television Shows Covered Under the Fair Labor Standards Act? 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 595, 612-617 
(2009) [hereinafter "Greenberg"]. Mr. Greenberg argues that child performers on reality television shows 
should not qualify as exempt actors for policy reasons that should, in his view, narrow the actor 
exemption for reality show child participants. Greenberg, 82 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 642 (noting that producers 
often deny "actor" status to avoid union representation for AFTRA and SAG). 
277  But see Leroy D. Clark, New Directions for the Civil Rights Movement: College Athletics as a Civil 
Rights Issue, 36 Howard L. J. 259, 279-280 (1993) (proposing litigation claiming that college athletes are 
employees within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act and state workers compensation statutes). 
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Purdham v. Fairfax County School Board,278 the Court of appeals affirmed a holding by 
the district court that a high-school golf coach was a "volunteer," and thus was not 
entitled to overtime compensation under the FLSA. Like other coaches in the school 
system, the plaintiff held a regular, salaried job with the school system and coached on 
the side. He received reimbursement of expenses and a $2100 "stipend" for his coaching 
activities.279 As the dispute was developing, the Department of Labor issued a "guidance 
opinion letter," concluding that certain school coaches were volunteers instead of 
employees.280  
"Under the FLSA, “ ‘employ’ [means] to suffer or permit to work.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). To 
be sure, this definition was “not intended to stamp all persons as employees who, 
without any express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their own 
advantage on the premises of another,” nor should it be interpreted so as to ‘sweep 
under the Act each person who, without promise or expectation of compensation, but 
solely for his personal purpose or pleasure, work[s] in activities carried on by other 
persons either for their pleasure or profit. 
 “* * * 
“The FLSA does not itself define volunteer, but pursuant to a Department of Labor 
regulation promulgated under the FLSA, a volunteer is an individual who performs 
hours of service for a public agency for civic, charitable, or humanitarian reasons, 
without promise, expectation or receipt of compensation for services rendered. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 553.101(a). At the same time, ‘[v]olunteers may be paid expenses, reasonable benefits, 
a nominal fee, or any combination thereof, for their service without losing their status as 
volunteers.’ 29 C.F.R. § 553.106(a)."281 
The usual definition of "employee" is not helpful in the volunteer context, says the 
Fourth Circuit: 
"Other courts have looked to the economic realities test in the FLSA context in 
determining whether an individual is an employee or a volunteer. However, they have 
                                                 
278  637 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2011). 
279  637 F.3d at 425. 
280  637 F.3d at 436 (describing, but not citing, DOL letter). 
281  637 F.3d at 427-428 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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concluded that the test is best suited to determine whether, as a matter of economic 
reality, an individual is in business for himself or herself as an independent contractor, 
or is an employee of another. As a result, the economic realities test is of limited utility 
in determining whether an individual is an ‘employee,’ as opposed to a ‘volunteer.’"282 
The likelihood that college athletes are protected by the FLSA is low because of the 
pervasive view that they qualify as “students.” While some courts have used the 
economic reality test from independent-contractor controversies to assess student 
status, most examine whether the individual performing work or the institution for 
which he works receives the primary benefit of the work.283   
The challenges for anyone wishing to assert FLSA protection for college athletes are 
manifold. First the athletes are formally classified as students; indeed NCAA eligibility 
rules require student status as a pre-requisite for playing college sports.284 In Agnew v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,285 the court emphasized the centrality of NCAA 
eligibility rules in defining the nature of college sports. 
On the other hand: 
"No knowledgeable observer could earnestly assert that big-time college football 
programs competing for highly sought-after high school football players do not 
anticipate economic gain from a successful recruiting program. Despite the nonprofit 
status of NCAA member schools, the transactions those schools make with premier 
athletes—full scholarships in exchange for athletic services—are not noncommercial, 
since schools can make millions of dollars as a result of these transactions. FN5 Indeed, 
this is likely one reason that some schools are willing to pay their football coaches up to 
$5 million a year rather than invest that money into educational resources. . . . Thus, the 
                                                 
282  637 F.3d at 433-434 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
283  See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 532 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming denial 
of injunction for violation of FLSA child-labor provisions by school that emphasized practical work for 
training purposes; reviewing cases and applying primary benefit test). 
284  NCAA Division I Manual § 12.01.1 (2012), 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D1_2012_01.pdf ("Only an amateur student-athlete 
is eligible for intercollegiate athletics participation in a particular sport"). 
285   ___ F.3d ___, No. 11-3066, 2012 WL 2248509 at *11 (7th Cir. June 18, 2012) (affirming dismissal of 
Sherman Act suit challenging limitation on athletic scholarships). 
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transactions between NCAA schools and student-athletes are, to some degree, 
commercial in nature, and therefore take place in a relevant market with respect to the 
Sherman Act."286 
 
In evaluating NCAA limitations on scholarships, however, it recognized that 
scholarships are a form of payment for services, in effect recognizing that playing sports 
is performing "work" for the sponsoring college: 
"It is true that the prohibition against multi-year scholarships is, in a sense, a rule 
concerning the amount of payment a player receives for his labor, and thus may seem to 
implicate the split between amateur and pay-for-play sports. After all, student-athletes 
are paid, but their payment is limited to reimbursement for costs attendant to receiving 
an education. For the purposes of college sports, and in the name of amateurism, we 
consider players who receive nothing more than educational costs in return for their 
services to be ‘unpaid athletes.’"287 
It is clear from this and other language quoted from the opinion in § ___ that the 
Seventh Circuit thought that a labor market subject to the Sherman Act could be 
alleged, but it found that the plaintiff's complaint did not allege it.288 If a labor market 
exists, that presupposes that the services performed are “work,” thus opening the door 
to FLSA claims. 
V. Tolerance of certain anti-competitive arrangements 
Despite their identification with the promotion of competition, the antitrust laws 
tolerate certain anti-competitive arrangements likely to enhance efficiency and therefore 
consumer welfare. Prominent among these are restrictions on competition in labor 
markets. Others include anti-competitive regimes that also have pro-competitive effects 
outweighing the diminution in competition. 
                                                 
286  Agnew v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, ___ F.3d ___, No. 11-3066, 2012 WL 2248509 at *9 hn 13. 
(7th Cir. June 18, 2012) (affirming dismissal of Sherman Act suit challenging limitation on athletic 
scholarships) 
287  Agnew at *12. 
288  Agnew as *15 hn 19, 20. 
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Some of these anti-competitive arrangements may be within the labor exemptions, 
when the employer-employee relationship is the matrix of the controversy. Others are 
outside them, but are nevertheless permissible because their pro-competitive effects 
outweigh their harm to competition. This part of the article analyzes typical anti-
competitive arrangements in the entertainment industries, asking whether they are 
within the labor exemptions and, regardless of whether they are, the strength of their 
pro-competitive justifications within the rule of reason. 
Because the distinction between labor markets and product markets289 is almost as 
indistinct as the boundaries of the labor exemptions, this part makes no attempt to 
classify restrictions as product-market restrictions as opposed to labor market 
restrictions. 
A. Supreme court touchstrones for anti-competitive labor market 
arrangements 
The law privileges anti-competitive labor market arrangements under the labor 
exemptions to the antitrust laws and under labor standards legislation. 
Synthesizing from the most prominent Supreme Court cases considering the labor 
exemptions, one can conclude: 
 An agreement by employers to do business only with union subcontractors is 
outside the exemption (Allen Bradley) 
 An agreement to put smaller employers out of business is outside the exemption 
(Pennington) 
 An agreement by non-union firm to subcontract work only to union firms is 
outside the exemption (Connell) 
 Independent contractors may be covered by the exemption if they compete with 
employees (H. A. Artists) 
 An agreement to limit hours of operation is within the exemption (Jewell Tea) 
 An agreement by employer-association members to provide strike benefits to 
each other may be within or without the exemption (Safeway) 
 Unilateral imposition, after impasse, of a fixed salary is within the exemption 
(Brown) 
                                                 




B. Concerted refusals to deal 
Refusals to deal with workers in a particular class or concerted refusals to deal with 
firms in a particular class are mainstream limitations on competition. Indeed, every 
contract represents an indirect refusal to deal. When a supply contract, say with an ISP 
for an Internet connection, is exclusive, it expressly constitutes a refusal to deal with 
other ISPs for the term of the contract. Even when it is not exclusive—as most are not—
it lessens the demand for Internet connections through other sellers because most 
Internet users need only one connection at a particular facility. Such contracts enhance 
the functioning of competitive markets because they provide certainty of supply and 
price and strengthen the position of both parties to the contract.290 
Concerted refusals to deal are more suspect than unilateral ones, because they have 
stronger anti-competitive effect: they foreclose more of the market for those who are 
locked out of the deal. Concerted refusals to deal are suspect under the antitrust laws 
because they limit competition by persons or entities excluded by the agreement.  At the 
highest level of abstraction, concerted refusals to deal involve networks that controls 
access to a resource—jobs or product market channels. The network denies access to 
anyone who is not a member of the network.  This could involve a horizontal labor 
network such as a union membership agreement that prohibits members from working 
for a non-union employer, or it could be a horizontal product network, such as a 
collective bargaining agreement that prohibits an employer from using non-union labor. 
But even concerted refusals to deal can have sufficient pro-competitive effects to 
withstand antitrust attack.291 
Concerted refusals to deal abound in labor and product markets in the entertainment 
industries—as they indeed do in every industry. Virtually every collectively bargaining 
arrangement in the entertainment industries provides an absolute or limited preference 
                                                 
290   “One problem presented by the language of § 1 of the Sherman Act is that it cannot mean what it 
says. The statute says that ‘every’ contract that restrains trade is unlawful. But, as Mr. Justice Brandeis 
perceptively noted, restraint is the very essence of every contract; read literally, § 1 would outlaw the 
entire body of private contract law. Yet it is that body of law that establishes the enforceability of 
commercial agreements and enables competitive markets-indeed, a competitive economy-to function 
effectively." City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 385 n.1 (1991) (rejecting 
antitrust challenge to municipality's restrictions on outdoor advertising). 
291  See Princo Corp. v. International Trade Com'n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that pro-
competitive effects of horizontal agreements among patent holders to set standards for writable CDs was 
valid under rule of reason). 
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for certain employees.292 The NFL collective bargaining agreement293 requires players 
either to become members of the union or to pay the union a "service fee,"294 and 
prohibits teams from entering into contracts with players other the form contracts 
provided in the collective agreement.295 Television labor agreements limit employment 
to union members.296 Actors Equity prohibits working except under an Equity 
contract,297 and provides for expulsion of members who work without a contract or 
Equity approval.298 It controls the hiring process for Equity productions through its 
regulated audition process. 299 
                                                 
292 Compare CAT Rule 48(F) (prohibiting employment of "non-professionals" until specified number of 
Equity actors have been employed) with CAT Rule 40 (explicitly permitting employment of "non-
professionals"). 
293 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (Aug. 4, 2011), 
https://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/files/2011CBA.pdf 
294 NFL Agreeemnt Art. 47, sec. 1. 
295 NFL Agreement Art. 4. 
296  AFTRA 2010-2011 Interactive Media Agreement § 13, http://www.aftra.org/documents/2010-
2011_IMA_Code_FINAL.pdf (prohibiting employer signatory from employing performers who are not 
members of AFTRA or who make application for membership within 30 days) 
297   "[I]f you are an Equity member, you may not accept any work in Equity jurisdiction without the 
appropriate contract. Even if the project is not listed here; you are still obligated to call Equity if you are 
offered any stage work without a union contract." Equity 4As "Do Not Work" Notice, 
http://www.actorsequity.org/NewsMedia/TakeAction/Feb14.4As.asp (Apr. 2, 2012) (listing theatres and 
production company for which Equity members may not work). 
298  Article X sec. 1 of the Actors Equity Bylaws provides: 
“A member may be expelled, suspended, fined or otherwise disciplined for any of the 
following offenses: 
* * * 
(d) engaging in any business, enterprise or activity which may directly or indirectly 
conflict with the purposes or objects of the Association or any of its members, including 
by way of example, work as a per former or stage manager in any form of theatre under 
the jurisdiction of the Association without benefit of an Equity employment contract or 
code, unless prior written consent by the Association has been granted.” 
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All of these are concerted refusals to deal with those not given a preference. 
Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n300 involved an antitrust action challenging, among other 
things, the college draft provisions of the national basketball collective bargaining 
agreement as an illegal horizontal agreement to eliminate competition for players' 
services. The court held that the horizontal agreement was so clearly shielded by the 
non-statutory exemption that it need not decide whether the draft was a per se violation 
or subject to rule of reason analysis.301 
The court likened the draft to a hiring hall arrangement: 
"[C]ollective agreements in a number of industries provide for the exclusive referral of 
workers by a hiring hall to particular employers at a specified wage. The choice of 
employer is governed by the rules of the hiring hall, not the preference of the individual 
worker. There is nothing that prevents such agreements from providing that the 
employee either work for the designated employer at the stipulated wage or not be 
referred at that time. Otherwise, a union might find it difficult to provide the requisite 
number of workers to employers. Such an arrangement is functionally indistinguishable 
from the college draft."302   
In Genser v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,303 the district court held that a 
hiring hall arrangement was shielded from antitrust liability by the non-statutory labor 
exemption: 
                                                                                                                                                             
Actors Equity Bylaws art. X, sec. 1 & 1(d), 
http://www.actorsequity.org/docs/about/AEA_ConstitutionBylaws.pdf. 
299  See Mark D. Meredith, From Dancing Halls to Hiring Halls: Actors' Equity and the Closed Shop 
Dilemma, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 178 (1996) (explaining and justifying Equity's role as a hiring hall, and 
reviewing its evolution from a pre-entry closed shop to an operation allowing non-union actors to 
audition). Id. at 182 (advocating extension1 of the immunity for closed shop hiring halls in the 
construction industry under 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(f) to Actors Equity). 
300  809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). 
301  809 F.2d at 959. 
302  809 F.3d at 960 [internal quotations and citations omitted]. 
303  522 F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
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"The Seniority System is basically a ‘hiring hall.’ When an electrical contractor who is a 
party to the Principal Agreement wishes to hire an additional electrician, he applies to 
the System and the electrician with the greatest seniority is referred to him. Such a 
System fills the legitimate labor objective of providing job security in a labor market 
that is both highly mobile and subject to underemployment."304 
In Associated General Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Co.,305 the district court held that 
hiring-hall arrangements are not prohibited closed-shop arrangements under section 
14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act:306 
"[A] greements that merely require an affiliation with a labor union, such as a non-
discriminatory, exclusive hiring-hall arrangement, do not come within § 14(b)‘s 
exception to Board jurisdiction, for such an agreement does not require Membership in 
a union."307 
Other concerted refusals to deal do not involve hiring halls, but still protect the 
collective bargaining process. In H. A. Artists & Associates, Inc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n,308 
the Supreme Court considered whether Equity, the union for stage actors, violated the 
antitrust laws by prohibiting its members from doing business with agents who did not 
pay Equity a fee and agree to Equity's rules limiting agent compensation.  
"The essential features of the regulatory scheme are identical: members are permitted to 
deal only with agents who have agreed (1) to honor their fiduciary obligations by 
avoiding conflicts of interest, (2) not to charge excessive commissions, and (3) not to 
book members for jobs paying less than the union minimum. And as in Carroll, Equity's 
regulation of agents developed in response to abuses by employment agents who 
occupy a critical role in the relevant labor market. The agent stands directly between 
                                                 
304  522 F. Supp. at 1160. 
305  457 F. Supp. 1207 (D ND 1978) (finding lack of standing in antitrust action). 
306   29 U.S.C.  § 164(b). 
307  457 F. Supp. at 1217. 
308   451 U.S. 704 (1981). 
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union members and jobs, and is in a powerful position to evade the union's negotiated 
wage structure."309  
The Court found that the practical realities of the theatre industry made it impossible 
for Equity to defend the integrity of the minimum wage scale it negotiated with theatre 
producers without regulating agency fees.310 It concluded, therefore, that the agents 
were a "labor group" and that the agreement between Equity and the agents fell within 
the statutory exemption.311 Equity's franchise system for agents essentially functioned as 
a substitute for Equity's maintaining a hiring hall.312 
Labor law circumscribes hiring hall arrangements, however. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
San Diego County District Council of Carpenters,313 the Supreme Court  evaluated 
carpenters’ picketing of Sears after the company refused to agree to limit its 
employment of carpenters to those that had been dispatched from the union hiring 
hall.314 
“If an object of the picketing was to force Sears into assigning the carpentry work away 
from its employees to Union members  dispatched from the hiring hall, the picketing 
may have been prohibited by § 8(b)(4)(D). Alternatively, if an object of  the picketing 
was to coerce Sears into signing a prehire or members-only type agreement with the 
Union, the picketing was at least arguably subject to the prohibition on recognitional 
picketing contained in § 8(b)(7)(C). "315 
                                                 
309   451 U.S. at 719-720. 
310   451 U.S. at 720. 
311   451 U.S. at 721. 
312   451 U.S. at 721. 
313  436 U.S. 180 (1978) (holding that a state-law action for trespass was not preempted by National Labor 
Relations Act). 
314  436 U.S. at 182. 
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Outside the collective bargaining context, concerted refusals to deal are not likely to be 
shielded by the labor exemptions, but they nevertheless may promote competition or 
other aspects of social welfare sufficiently that they do not result in antitrust liability.316 
C. Salary caps and other limitations on compensation of employees 
Employers have an inherent interest in limiting their costs. Labor costs are an important 
component of total costs in any entertainment industry. The possibility of the richest 
employers bidding up the prices for stars is a phenomenon, not only of professional 
sports, but also of the movie and theatre industries. Concerted restrictions on wage 
levels reduce competition in the labor market and are thus subject to antitrust scrutiny 
unless they are shielded by the labor exemption, or unless they pass muster under rule 
of reason analysis, having escaped per se treatment. One possible justification for salary 
caps is that they increase the possibility for weaker employers to attract stars—or at 
least to conserve their resources in order to remain competitive with stronger 
employers.317 
 
D. Employee mobility 
In a competitive labor market employees are free to change jobs to seek better terms of 
employment, and employers are free to try to hire employers of competitors. Firms 
have an interest in restricting this mobility because, when the demand for labor exceed 
the supply competition will lead to employer bidding up of wage rates, resulting in 
higher labor costs. If an employer can contractually bind existing employees to continue 
their services rather than seeking other jobs, they limit wage inflation. 
                                                 
316  See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), discussed supra, § 
___ (approving horizontal arrangement for collective licensing of copyrights); Ticketmaster Corp. v. 
Tickets.comm Inc., 127 Fed. Appx. 346 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction for 
concerted refusal to deal; evidence showed competitive bidding and exclusive contracts with duration no 
longer than six years); Flagship Theatres of Palm Desert, LLC v. Century Theatres, Inc., 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 
519, 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (reversing district court and allowing discovery in state antitrust action by 
single movie theatre alleging that exclusive film exhibition contracts violated rule of reason). 
317 See National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding salary cap, 




Moreover, competitive labor markets present the risks that an employee with inside 
knowledge of an employer practices, including but not limited to trade secrets, may 
take that knowledge to a competitor. Covenants not to compete are common 
mechanisms to reduce this risk.318   
The reserve clause and the free-agent system in professional football represent 
important limitations on athletes’ power to change teams, justified by the need to 
promote competitive balance. If athletes were free to move around as they wished, they 
could all flock to richer teams, leaving weaker teams unable to compete successfully. 
Restrictions on "contract jumping"--the privilege of an employee to move from one 
employer to another-- is a source of controversy for most entertainment industries. 
Employers want to restrict movement; employees want to facilitate it.319 
In Mackey v. National Football League,320 the court of appeals held that the Rozelle Rule321 
violated the Sherman Act. It held that the non-statutory labor exemption did not apply 
because the Rozelle Rule did not satisfy three criteria for pre-eminence of labor policy 
over antitrust law: 
1. The restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining 
agreement;322 
2. The agreement must concern a mandatory subject of bargaining; and 
                                                 
318  See Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that covenants not to compete 
that barred employees of subsidiary from being employed by seller of subsidiary satisfied antitrust rule 
of reason; limitation was necessary to assure workforce continuity incident to corporate sale, and eight-
month restrict was not too broad). 
319 Robert C. Berry et al, Labor Relations in Professional Sports text accompanying n. 7. 
320  543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
321  "The Rozelle Rule essentially provides that when a player's contractual obligation to a team expires 
and he signs with a different club, the signing club must provide compensation to the player's former 
team. If the two clubs are unable to conclude mutually satisfactory arrangements, the Commissioner may 
award compensation in the form of one or more players and/or draft choices as he deems fair and 
equitable." 543 F.2d at 609 n.1. 




3. The agreement must be the product of bona-fide arm's-length bargaining.323 
While the Rozelle Rule affected only the parties to the agreements and involved a 
mandatory subject of bargaining, it did not involve bona fide arm's length bargaining, 
because it had remained essentially unchanged since it was unilaterally imposed by the 
teams in 1963.324 
Because the labor exemption was unavailable, the court moved to application of 
antitrust principles. Finding that per-se illegality was inappropriate,325 It agreed with 
the district court's analysis of the anti-competitive effect of the Rule: 
"the Rozelle Rule significantly deters clubs from negotiating with and signing free 
agents; that it acts as a substantial deterrent to players playing out their options and 
becoming free agents; that it significantly decreases players' bargaining power in 
contract negotiations; that players are thus denied the right to sell their services in a free 
and open market; that as a result, the salaries paid by each club are lower than if 
competitive bidding were allowed to prevail; and that absent the Rozelle Rule, there 
would be increased movement in interstate commerce of players from one club to 
another."326 
As to the alleged pro-competitive effects of the Rule, the court rejected the NFL 
assertion of the Rule's necessity for maintenance of competitive balance within the 
league: 
"We need not decide whether a system of inter-team compensation for free agents 
moving to other teams is essential to the maintenance of competitive balance in the 
NFL. Even if it is, we agree with the district court's conclusion that the Rozelle Rule is 
significantly more restrictive than necessary to serve any legitimate purposes it might 
have in this regard. First, little concern was manifested at trial over the free movement 
of average or below average players. Only the movement of the better players was 
urged as being detrimental to football. Yet the Rozelle Rule applies to every NFL player 
regardless of his status or ability. Second, the Rozelle Rule is unlimited in duration. It 
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324  543 F.2d at 615-616. 
325  543 F.2d at 620. 
326  543 F.2d at 620. 
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operates as a perpetual restriction on a player's ability to sell his services in an open 
market throughout his career. Third, the enforcement of the Rozelle Rule is 
unaccompanied by procedural safeguards. A player has no input into the process by 
which fair compensation is determined. Moreover, the player may be unaware of the 
precise compensation demanded by his former team, and that other teams might be 
interested in him but for the degree of compensation sought."327 
Employees retain more mobility in the theatre industry, where the need to promote 
competitive balance is attenuated.  For example, the master agreement between Actors 
Equity and Chicago Area Theatres explicitly allows actors to accept "more remunerative 
employment" from other productions, even when they are under contract to another 
production.328 
E. Assuring a stream of new talent 
In purely competitive labor markets, the transaction costs of matching employers with 
employees (or independent contractors) can be high, especially when the markets are 
regional or national in scope rather than local. Both buyers and sellers of labor have an 
interest in such markets of supporting intermediaries that reduce the costs. Depending 
on how the intermediation is structured, however, it may have anti-competitive effects 
in product markets that go beyond what is necessary to improve labor market 
efficiency.329 
The draft system in professional football is intended, on the one hand, to assure 
competitive balance by steering new talent to different teams equitably. But it also 
serves the interests of new talent by establishing a transparent “hiring hall” in which all 
players entering the professional sports arena are assured of visibility.330 
                                                 
327  543 F.2d at 622. 
328 Actors Equity CAT Rulebook Rule 36 (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.actorsequity.org/docs/rulebooks/CAT_Rulebook_09-11.pdf. 
329  An antitrust challenge by medical students to the mandatory residency match program was 
interrupted by a federal statute giving the match program an exemtpion to the antitrust laws. See Jung v. 
Association of American Medical Colleges, 339 F. Supp.2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2004) (describing claim and 
legislation). 
330 See generally NFL Agreement Art. 6 (providing for and regulating team choices in "College Draft"). 
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In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,331 the court of appeals held that the draft 332 violated the 
Sherman Act under rule-of-reason analysis. The NFL did not appeal the district court's 
ruling that the labor exemption did not apply.333 
It rejected the district court's conclusion that the draft constituted a group boycott, per 
se illegal,334 and concluded that the draft differed from a classic group boycott: 
"[The teams are] not Competitors in any economic sense. The clubs operate basically as 
a joint venture  in producing an entertainment product football games and telecasts. No 
NFL club can produce this product without agreements and joint action with every 
other team. To this end, the League not only determines franchise locations, playing 
                                                 
331  593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
332 "The NFL draft, which has been in effect since 1935, is a procedure under which 
negotiating rights to graduating college football players are allocated each year among 
the NFL clubs in inverse order of the clubs' standing. Under the draft procedures 
generally followed, the team with the poorest playing-field record during the preceding 
season has the first opportunity, as among the NFL teams, to select a college player of 
its choice; the team with the next poorest record has the next choice, and so on until the 
team with the best record (the winner of the previous year's “Super Bowl”) has picked 
last. At this point, the first “round” of the draft is completed. In 1968 there were 16 
succeeding rounds in the yearly draft, the same order of selection being followed in 
each round. Teams had one choice per round unless they had traded their choice in that 
round to another team (a fairly common practice). When Smith was selected by the 
Redskins there were 26 teams choosing in the draft. 
The NFL draft, like similar procedures in other professional sports, is designed to 
promote ‘competitive balance.’ By dispersing newly arriving player talent equally 
among all NFL teams, with preferences to the weaker clubs, the draft aims to produce  
teams that are as evenly-matched on the playing field as possible. Evenly-matched 
teams make for closer games, tighter pennant races, and better player morale, thus 
maximizing fan interest, broadcast revenues, and overall health of the sport." 593 F.2d 
at 1175-1176 [internal quotations and citations omitted]. 
333  593 F.2d at 1177 n.11. It found the labor exemption inapplicable because the draft was not the product 
of collective bargaining and did not constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining. 420 F. Supp. at 742-743. 
334  593 F.2d at 1178; 593 F.2d at 1181 (rejecting per se analysis). 
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schedules, and broadcast terms, but also ensures that the clubs receive equal shares of 
telecast and ticket revenues. These economic joint venturers ‘compete’ on the playing 
field, to be sure, but here as well cooperation is essential if the entertainment product is 
to attain a high quality: only if the teams are “competitively balanced” will spectator 
interest be maintained at a high pitch. No NFL team, in short, is interested in driving 
another team out of business, whether in the counting-house or on the football field, for 
if the League fails, no one team can survive."335  
The per-se prohibition of group boycotts is properly restricted to concerted attempts by 
competitors to exclude horizontal competitors; it does not apply to concerted refusals to 
deal aimed at some other goal.336 
Under rule-of-reason analysis, the court accepted the district court's findings of severe 
anti-competitive effect 337  
"The draft inescapably forces each seller of football services to deal with one, and only 
one buyer, robbing the seller, as in any monopsonistic market, of any real bargaining 
power. The draft leaves no room whatever for competition among the teams for the 
services of college players, and utterly strips them of any measure of control over the 
marketing of their talents. The predictable effect of the draft . . . was to lower the salary 
levels of the best college players. There can be no doubt that the effect of the draft as it 
existed in 1968 was to suppress or even destroy competition in the market for players' 
services."338 
The court  then proceeded to consider--and to reject--the pro-competitive justification 
for the draft: 
"The draft is procompetitive if at all, in a very different sense from that in which it is 
anticompetitive. The draft is anticompetitive in its effect on the market for players' 
services, because it virtually eliminates economic competition among buyers for the 
services of sellers. The draft is allegedly procompetitive in its effect on the playing field; 
but the NFL teams are not economic competitors on the playing field, and the draft, 
                                                 
335  593 F.2d at 1179. 
336  593 F.2d at 1180 
337 593 F.2d at 1183-1184. 
338  593 F.2d at 1185-1186 [internal quotations and citations omitted]. 
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while it may heighten athletic competition and thus improve the entertainment product 
offered to the public, does not increase competition in the economic sense of 
encouraging others to enter the market and to offer the product at lower cost. . . . In 
strict economic terms, the draft's demonstrated procompetitive effects are nil.”339 
The court suggested alternatives that would have less anti-competitive effect: 
"Without intimating any view as to the legality of the following procedures, we note 
that there exist significantly less anticompetitive alternatives to the draft system which 
has been challenged here. The trial judge found that the evidence supported the 
viability of a player selection system that would permit more than one team to draft 
each player, while restricting the number of players any one team might sign. A less 
anticompetitive draft might permit a college player to negotiate with the team of his 
choice if the team that drafted him failed to make him an acceptable offer. The NFL 
could also conduct a second draft each year for players who were unable to reach 
agreement with the team that selected them the first time. Most obviously, perhaps, the 
District Court found that the evidence supported the feasibility of a draft that would 
run for fewer rounds, applying only to the most talented players and enabling their 
‘average’ brethren to negotiate in a ‘free market’ The least restrictive alternative of all, of 
course, would be for the NFL to eliminate the draft entirely and employ revenue-
sharing to equalize the teams' financial resources a method of preserving ‘competitive 
balance’ nicely in harmony with the league's self-proclaimed ‘joint-venture’ status."340 
The court then remanded for consideration of damages.341 
In the theatre and movie industries, the initial hiring process is less comprehensive. 
Anyone may try out at an open audition, but only Equity Members and Equity 
Candidates may participate in Equity-run auditions. The Equity agreement requires a 
certain number of days of open auditions for Equity members and candidates, without 
restricting auditions for non-equity members.342  
                                                 
339   593 F.2d at 1186-1187 [internal quotations and citations omitted]. 
340  593 F.2d at 1187-1188 [internal footnotes omitted]. 
341  593 F.2d at 1191. 
342 CAT Agreement Rule 5(B)(2). 
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The movie industry has more explicit provisions to assure entry-level opportunity. The 
SAG agreement has specific non-discrimination provisions to enhance casting 
opportunities for disadvantaged groups, including the disabled and older actors343 It 
also prohibits excluding actors without agents from auditions.344 
F. Contracting out 
In a perfectly competitive market, firms can decide whether to “make or buy.”345 Hiring 
contractors to do the work that employees otherwise can do, however, obviously has an 
adverse effect on present or potential employees. They have an interest in restricting 
that competition between independent contractors and employees. 
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,346 the Supreme Court agreed with the NLRB 
that contracting out work previously performed by members of the bargaining unit 
constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining.347 In First National Maintenance Corp. v. 
NLRB,348 however, the Supreme Court held that an employer has no duty under the 
NLRA to bargain with a union over a decision to terminate a relationship with an 
important customer and to close a part of its business. It distinguished pure business 
decisions from decisions about employment conditions: 
" The present case concerns a . . . type of management decision, . . . that had a direct 
impact on employment, since jobs were inexorably eliminated by the termination, but 
[also] had as its focus only the economic profitability of the contract with Greenpark, a 
concern under these facts wholly apart from the employment relationship."349 
The Court concluded that the harm to the employer's need to make a management 
decision to shut down part of its business outweighed the incremental benefit of 
                                                 
343 SAG, 2005 Theatrical Agreement at Art. 26(a)(4) and (5). 
344 Id. at Art. 26(a)6(b). 
345  See discussion of Coase Theorem in § ___. 
346  379 U.S. 203 (1964). 
347  379 U.S. at 209. 
348  452 U.S. 666 (1981). 
349  452 U.S. at 676-677 [internal quotations and citations omitted]. 
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requiring bargaining with the union.350 It left undisturbed, however, the basic holding of 
Fireboard and declined to express a view on whether other types of management 
decisions such as subcontracting or automation might be subject to the duty to 
bargaining.351 
G. Regulating channels for reaching audiences 
In a perfectly competitive product market, competition exists at every stage of the 
supply chain: each potential purchaser of goods or servers can compete to get the best 
deal, and every potential seller of goods and services can compete for the business of 
every purchaser. Exclusive distribution and supply arrangements are common, 
however, in most industries. The entertainment industries are no exception. 
In the movie industry, completing a movie does not ensure that anyone will ever see it. 
Distribution and exhibition are necessary to connect movies with audiences. Major 
studios perform not only production, but also distributions functions. The Paramount 
decision352 prohibits them from also being in the exhibition business. Independent 
producers, however, often contract with others for distribution. Because of the 
importance of distribution to the capacity of a producer to pay actors and other 
employees, the Screen Actors Guild ("SAG") agreement contains detailed regulations for 
distribution enterprises and the agreements with them.353 
In Flash Electronics, Inc. v. Universal Music & Video Distribution Corp.,354 independent 
distributors of home videos and DVDs of movies and TV shows filed a Sherman Act 
section 1 challenge against exclusive distribution contracts between the major movie 
studios and the plaintiffs' competing distribution firms. The district court began its 
analysis by noting that vertical restraints, such as one between movie studios and firms 
that distribute their product to retailers typically are evaluated under the rule of reason 
                                                 
350  452 U.S. at 686. 
351  452 U.S. at 686 n.22, citing  Dan Dee West Virginia Corp., 180 N.L.R.B. 534 (1970) (decision to change 
method of distribution, under which employee-drivers became independent contractors). 
352 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
353 Screen Actors Guild, 2005 Theatrical Agreement Art. 6, 
http://www.sag.org/files/sag/2005TheatricalAgreement.pdf (responsibility for payments). 
354   312 F. Supp.2d 379 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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rather than treated as per se violations.355 It noted the kinds of pro-competitive effects 
that vertical deals can have: 
"[V]ertical restrictions on intrabrand competition often have the procompetitive effect of 
increasing interbrand competition in the relevant market. . . .  Accordingly, 
manufacturers should be given wide latitude in determining the profile of [their] 
distributorships. Indeed, . . . absent a showing of price-fixing or an anticompetitive 
effect on the market as a whole, run-of-the-mill exclusive distributorship agreements 
are presumptively legal.”356 
This is a less important issue in professional sports, where the teams and the leagues 
directly perform marketing and organize games, or in the theatre industry, where a 
production rarely proceeds beyond the script stage unless theatre space for 
performance has already been arranged. 
H. Sharing new product-market revenue streams 
Technology driven revolutions produce new sources of revenue for entertainment. 
Whether and how to share those new revenue streams with employees is a frequent 
source of controversy. The 2011 Television Decision357 forced the NFL to share additional 
television revenues from its deal to protect itself from the adverse effects of a strike or 
lockout. The 2007 strike by the Writers' Guild over shares of DVD and Internet revenue 
for television shows and movies358 is another example. In 2011 a class action lawsuit 
over collection and distribution of statutory royalties for sales of blank DVDs and tapes 
was settled.359 The 2010 American Needle Supreme Court decision, discussed below,  
involving licensing fees for sales of sports paraphernalia is yet another example.360 
                                                 
355   312 F. Supp.2d at 386. 
356   312 F. Supp.2d at 386-387 [internal quotations and citations omitted]. 
357 See §2.2[D]. 
358 Times Topics, N.Y. Times Feb. 10, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/organizations/w/writers_guild_of_america/index.h
tml 
359 See Screen Actors Guild, Notice, http://www.sag.org/notice. 
360 See generally Playing for Dollars at 58 (noting the increasing importance to football of licensing fees). 
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The Safeway case, analyzed in § ___, observed that, under  Citizen Publishing Co. v. 
United States,361 revenue sharing arrangements usually are per-se antitrust violations. It 
distinguished the strike-benefits provision in the case before it however, because of its 
short-term nature and its limited overage, holding that it must be evaluated under the 
rule of reason.362 It should also have included its obvious relationship to a labor dispute 
as part of the rule of reason analysis, but it did not. 
In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League,363 a case involving licensing of 
intellectual property in sports paraphernalia, the Supreme Court rejected the Seventh 
Circuit's conclusion that the NFL functioned as a "single entity" with respect to licensing 
intellectual property.  
“Directly relevant to this case, the teams compete in the market for intellectual property. 
To a firm making hats, the Saints and the Colts are two potentially competing suppliers 
of valuable trademarks. When each NFL team licenses its intellectual property, it is not 
pursuing the common interests of the whole league but is instead pursuing interests of 
each corporation itself; teams are acting as “separate economic actors pursuing separate 
economic interests, and each team therefore is a potential independent center of 
decisionmaking. Decisions by NFL teams to license their separately owned trademarks 
collectively and to only one vendor are decisions that deprive the marketplace of 
independent centers of decisionmaking, and therefore of actual or potential 
competition."364 
It remanded for rule of reason analysis of NFL exclusive licensing arrangements for 
team logos and paraphernalia.365 
The technological revolution impacts professional athletics by opening up new streams 
of revenue for videogames and Internet fantasy sports involvement. College football 
players have challenged, under the Sherman Act, the practice of colleges under NCAA 
                                                 
361   394 U.S. 131 (1969) (holding that profit pooling by competing newspapers constituted a per-se 
violation of section 1). 
362   651 F.3d at 1134-1136. 
363  ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (2010). 
364  130 S.Ct. at 2212-2213. 
365   130 S.Ct. at 2217. 
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rules to require college athletes to give colleges the exclusive power to license athlete 
images and personal identifying information. 366 
I. Limiting competition by independent contractors 
A competitive market for independent contractors threatens those with established 
market positions in two ways: it undercuts employee wage standards when an 
employer can get work done more cheaply by hiring independent contractors instead of 
hiring or retaining employees; it also may undercut product-market position when the 
independent contractors are firms rather than individuals active in the same product 
market. 
Three kinds of competitive restrictions on independent contracts arise to limit 
competition. Unions may bargain for limitations on contracting out in collective 
bargaining agreements. Firms may seek to exclude independent contractors from the 
product market by making deals with customers or suppliers of essential factors of 
production. The independent contractors themselves may seek to band together to limit 
competition among themselves. 
The general view is that independent contractors may not benefit from the labor 
exemption by banding together and calling themselves a labor union.367 In Allied 
Chemical and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,368 the Supreme Court reviewed 
the evolution of the statutory definition of employee, noting that Congress had 
amended the statute explicitly to exclude "independent contractors," after the Supreme 
Court, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications,369 agreed with the NLRB that newspaper street 
vendors were statutory employees.370  
                                                 
366  See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, No. C 09-
1967 CW, 2012 WL 1745593 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss Sherman Act complaint). 
367  Los Angeles Meat and Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 102-103 (1962) (holding 
that independent grease peddlers not immune from antitrust injunction requiring them to disband); 
Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 147 (1942) (holding that association of independent 
fisherman who wanted to fix prices were not covered by labor exemption). 
368  404 U.S. 157 (1971). 
369 , 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
370  404 U.S. at 167. 
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The prohibition is not absolute, however: 
"Even though a challenged combination includes independent contractors or 
entrepreneurs, it may come within the statutory exemption if the non-employee parties 
to the combination are in job or wage competition with the employee parties, or in some 
other economic interrelationship that substantially affects the legitimate interests of the 
employees.”371 
In Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild of America, Inc.,372 already analyzed in § ___, 
HBO filed an antitrust action against an association of freelance directors. The directors 
defended based on the labor exemption. The district court decided that the statutory 
exemption applied, because the directors qualified for employee, rather than 
independent contractor status, and because they competed with salaried employees.373 
In Julien v. Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers, Inc.,374 the district court 
determined that stage directors were entitled to labor exemption because they were 
employees. The producer exercised control over every aspect of work. One with 
experience in theatre might dispute the general validity of this assertion. In many 
productions, the director is the boss. 
In Ring v. Spina,375 the court determined that playwrights were not entitled to the labor 
exemption: 
"Here not only are the disputing parties not in an employer-employee relationship, but, 
unlike the Allen Bradley case, the controversy cannot concern itself with conditions of 
employment, since none of the parties affected are in any true sense employees. An 
author writing a book or play is usually not then even in any contractual relation with 
his producer. If and when he does contract, he does not continue in the producer's 
service to any appreciable or continuous extent thereafter. Normally the author appears 
more nearly like the fishermen entrepreneurs of the Hinton case or the doctors in the 
                                                 
371  Home Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild of America, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 578, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) 
372   531 F. Supp. 578, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), 
373   531 F. Supp. at 595 -597 [internal quotations and citations omitted]. 
374 No. 68 Civ. 5120, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15839, 80 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P11,888 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 7, 1975) 
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American Medical Association case than workmen banded together in a union. The 
minimum price and royalties provided by the Basic Agreement, unlike minimum wages 
in a collective bargaining agreement, are not remuneration for continued services, but 
are the terms at which a finished product or certain rights therein may be sold. And no 
wages or working conditions of any group of employees are directly dependent on 
these terms. We think the exception therefore inapplicable."376 
This line of cases suggests the following rules of thumb for combinations involving 
persons nominally characterized as independent contractors: Some independent 
contractors are shielded by the labor exemption if they are substitutes for employees. 
Independent contractors who are truly independent, however, such as indie musicians, 
independent theatre companies or producers, or indie movie-makers enjoy no labor 
exemption. 
J. Controlling other labor-market intermediaries 
The Supreme Court’s decision in H.A. Artists377 shielded collectively bargained 
restrictions on booking agents in the theatre industry, finding that the union had a 
legitimate interest in regulating agents in order to protect its wage bargain with 
theatres. The NCAA has even more comprehensive regulations for sports agents, 
outside the collective bargaining context. (College athletes are not employees, and thus 
not entitled to engage in collective bargaining under the NLRA.)378  
Rule-of-reason analysis is likely to validate such restrictions.379 Rules forbidding 
payments to athletes and requiring athletes to attend class are necessary for the product 
(college athletic contests) to exist at all.380 Regulation of agent payments to college 
athletes can be justified as necessary to protect the more fundamental rules forbidding 
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377  451 U.S. 704 (1981). 
378  See Blake Nielsen: Misconduct in Intercollegiate Sports: Inappropriate Benefits and Communications 
Between Agents and Collegiate Athletes (2010), 
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(discussing antitrust restrictions on NCAA). 
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payments to athletes. 381 The Tenth Circuit, however, found that NCAA limitations on 
coaches' salaries did not survive "quick-look" rule of reason analysis because its adverse 
effect on competition in the labor market for coaches outweighed its pro-competitive 
effect.382 
VI. The revolution and the rule of law 
The labor exemptions to the antitrust laws reflect a national policy that favors collective-
bargaining. That national policy, in turn, is premised on the idea that employees lack 
bargaining power vis-à-vis employers unless they band together. The concern about 
disparate bargaining power is appropriate more broadly in the entertainment industries 
as the technological revolution fragments production entities and blurs the distinction 
between labor markets and product markets.  
In many cases, the new, more atomized markets, will function just fine under 
competition. Where that is the case aggressive antitrust enforcement is socially 
beneficial. In other cases, production of the particular product requires restraints on 
competition, and subsidies flowing from the richer firms to the poorer ones—the 
professional football market.  In large-scale sports, such arrangements and subsidies are 
a mainstay. In other areas they are completely absent. 
Exempting anticompetitive arrangements from the antitrust laws under the labor 
exemption creates a counterpoise to the power of those who wish to limit competition: 
it takes place in the matrix of collective-bargaining which guarantees a certain amount 
of leverage in employee representatives. On the other hand, when rule-of-reason 
analysis exempts a competitive constraint, there is no guarantee of a countervailing 
force to police the anticompetitive arrangements. 
Moreover, sny assessment of the operation of revolutionary labor markets in 
entertainment is incomplete without considering what has become one of the most 
powerful pools to suppress competition: overaggressive interpretation and enforcement 
of copyright law. 
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A. Implications for the future 
As the Introduction pointed out, Internet-related technologies are likely to shift 
controversies between workers and those hiring them from relatively certain territory 
involving long-standing definitions of the labor exemptions, into less certain territory 
where the boundaries of the exemptions must be tested. Technology also is likely to 
push more controversies beyond the boundaries of the labor exemptions into antitrust 
territory where the antitrust rule of reason will require balancing anti-competitive 
effects against pro-competitive effects arising from the peculiar structural characteristics 
of the particular industry sector. 
1. Entrepreneurship continuum 
Two paradigmatic extremes illustrate the continuum along which the labor exemption 
operates. At one extreme is a market in which individual performers—say performance 
artists—band together to set theatre rental prices. At the other extreme is a market in 
which the cast of a stage play bands together to insist on limits on rehearsal schedules. 
2. Trends in industry structures 
The technological revolution has fragmented production systems in certain parts of the 
entertainment industry, especially movies, popular music, and some aspects of 
television, causing more of the coordination of inputs to take place through contracts 
negotiated in markets and fewer to take place within firms. Technology has driven this 
fragmentation in large part because it has reduced the barriers to entry.383  
                                                 
383 Compare Vogel at 15-17 (analyzing the traditionally high barriers to entry in entertainment industries) 
with Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,  New architectures for music: Law Should Get Out of the Way, 29 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L. J. 259 (2007) (explaining how Internet and PC technologies have reduced barriers to 
entry for musicians) and Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New Business Models for Music, 18 VILLANOVA SPORTS 
& ENT. L. J. 63 (2010) (same) and Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Technologies of Storytelling: New Models for 
Movies, 10 VIRGINIA SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 106 (2010) (same for moviemakers). 
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The AFL/CIO is adapting to these changes in labor markets by launching an initiative 
focused on jobs that do not fit the traditional model of full-time, long-term, attachment 
of employees to one employer. 384 
The “Coase Theorem” postulates that a firm’s decision whether to produce an input 
internally, with resources such as employees bound to it over the course of time, or 
externally, with contracts negotiated at arms’ length in the marketplace—often referred 
to as a “make or buy” decision-- is driven by the relative efficiency (cost) of the 
alternative approaches.385  
Internet-linked technologies have increased the relative efficiency of much work being 
performed outside traditional physical workplaces.386 The Coase Theorem accurately 
predicts that this causes the boundaries of firms to contract and for a greater share of 
labor to be performed under independent contracts rather than through employment 
relationships. This trend is particularly pronounced in the popular-music387 and video 
entertainment industries.388 Fewer musicians reach their markets through long-term 
deals with record labels rather than proceeding independently and finding audiences 
through the Internet. The studio system for producing Hollywood movies is long dead, 
and the current trend is to look to independent moviemakers for more of the content to 
be distributed through new channels. 
All of this results in fragmentation of both product and labor markets. More, smaller, 
units of production are becoming the norm. Fragmentation makes concerted action 
more difficult because it increases the transaction costs of organizing anti-competitive 
                                                 
384 Presentation by Richard Trumka, President of AFL/CIO at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Oct. 6, 2011 
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385 See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937); Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, 
Joint-Venture Analysis After American Needle, 7 J. Competition L. & Reg. 543, 548 & n.29 (2011) 
(criticizing American Needle's analysis of single entity in antitrust law; referring to Coase Theorem) 
386 See Mirian A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 951 (2011) (assessing implications 
for labor law of trend toward work being performed over the Internet rather than from fixed workplaces). 
387 Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,  New architectures for music: Law Should Get Out of the Way, 29 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L. J. 259 (2007); Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,New Business Models for Music, 18 VILLANOVA 
SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 63 (2010). 
388 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Technologies of Storytelling: New Models for Movies, 10 VIRGINIA SPORTS & 
ENT. L. J. 106 (2010) 
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arrangements in the first place and of policing them once they have been established.389 
Entertainment-industry unions know this. Thus the AFM makes no effort to unionize 
indie rock bands, Actors Equity makes no effort to pressure store-front theatres (except 
to restrict their use of Equity Actors), and AFSCME and SAG mostly ignore the indie 
movie phenomenon. 
The popularity of reality television shows has created stress on traditional scope of 
union representation and the FLSA artist exemption.390 
Technology is less likely to cause changes in the industry structure for professional 
football, but the technological revolution is likely to set off battles over ownership of 
new revenue streams for professional sports. For example, fan capture and re-broadcast 
of live games is both increasingly feasible and of uncertain status under copyright, 
trademark and right-of-publicity doctrines.391 
Whether a "guerrilla" making and distributing a video recording of a live football 
would infringe copyright is an interesting question. In Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major 
League Baseball Players Ass'n,392 the court of appeals suggested that a game itself is not 
copyrightable, but that as soon as it is recorded, as it usually is by those with explicit 
broadcast rights, the fixation element would be satisfied and the performance of the 
game, and not only the audiovisual work would be copyrighted. The court's analysis of 
the question, related as it was, to a finding of preemption of player publicity rights in 
the game, and related to its earlier emphasis on the creative originality of the authorized 
video capture resulting in the audio visual work, casts doubt on the robustness of its 
conclusion.  
                                                 
389  Mancur Olsen, The Logic of Collective Action ___ (____). 
390  Christopher C. Cianci, Entertainment or Exploitation?: Reality Television and the Inadequate 
Protection of Child Participants Under the Law, 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 363, 363-364 nn. 4-5 (2009) (citing 
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National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc.,393 involved a claim that display of 
blacked out football games by bar owners infringed copyright. The court of appeals 
agreed with the district court that it was the football game itself--"the game action, the 
noncommercial elements of the game" that constituted the work of authorship, fixed 
when it was broadcast by cable to non-blacked out areas.394 The defendants claimed that 
they copied no protected elements because they stripped out commentary and 
advertisements, reproducing, distributing and performing only the game itself.395 "The 
fixation, therefore, is the “original ‘works' of authorship” which is the opera, the dance 
ensemble, the address and the game. The fact that the performance is replete with 
network commercial insertions does not so restructure the program as to make it a new 
original work or to give it a new or final fixation,"396 the district court had said. 
These are questionable conclusions, in light of the copyright act’s explicit conclusion 
that facts are not copyrightable397 and the Supreme Court’s holding in Feist398 that the 
“sweat of the brow” expended in making facts available does not make the facts—as 
opposed to selection and arrangement—copyrightable. Live football games are facts. 
New technologies also are opening up new revenue opportunities. In professional 
sports the growth in fantasy football has been enabled by the Internet, and is a potential 
source of revenue for players and teams.399 Similarly, more sophisticated video games 
feature celebrities of all kinds, including college and professional athletes, resulting in a 
new stream of revenue the celebrities are eager to tap. 
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3. Doctrinal accommodation 
One way to deal with the antitrust problem for the lower strata is to think harder about 
impact on interstate commerce, particularly after the Supreme Court’s decision on the 
healthcare reform act,400 which suggests that for legislation to be valid, federal 
legislation must persuasively link small-scale conduct to interstate commerce.401 The 
impact of a storefront theatre production on interstate commerce is quite small. 
Exhibition of an indie movie on the Internet, however, obviously involves interstate 
commerce, because the Internet is global in its reach. Storefront theatre, garage bands, 
YouTube content producers, and indie moviemaking have minimal direct impact on 
interstate commerce, however, unlike concert tours by Linkin Park, a Chicago Bears 
football game, the Broadway production of Death of a Salesman, or the opening of the 
Avengers. But that won't solve the problem of state competition law. 
4. Areas of possible conflict 
a) Likely conflicts 
Indie musicians could organize to put pressure on performance venues to agree to 
minimum terms for public performances by indie musicians and bands. It is unlikely 
that such concerted action would qualify for either labor exemption. Indie musicians do 
not look like employees under the well-established tests, and they would be hard 
pressed to argue that the purchase of their services by venues qualifies as a labor 
market, as contrasted with a product market. Nevertheless, it is true that venues 
wanting to provide their customers with live music can either hire musicians as 
employees or retain the services of indie musicians. In this sense the relevant market is 
a labor market. 
Actors and production crafts could band together to put pressure on theatres and movie 
production companies to guarantee a certain number of slots for early-career-state 
personnel. The Equity agreements already seek to open up opportunities for new talent 
in specific categories, especially the disabled. If such efforts to accommodate new talent 
are part of the collective bargaining process, it almost certainly is exempt from antitrust 
scrutiny. Likewise, if the new talent acts in concert in non-union sectors of the movie 
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and theatre industries, exemption from antitrust liability also is likely depending on the 
craft; actors and directors look like employees under the traditional tests; writers, 
producers, lighting and sound designers, and set designers look more like independent 
contractors. Cinematographers fall somewhere in between, especially on indie 
productions.   
Itinerant theatre companies could band together to achieve more favorable terms from 
performance spaces renting theatre space. Exemption is unlikely because even the 
poorest theatre company is a business rather than an individual offering labor services. 
Any rule-of-reason argument would have to establish the pro-competitive effect of 
assuring the survival of independent theatre. 
Indie movie producers could band together to put pressure on distribution companies, 
including new Internet distribution firms, to achieve access. Eligibility for a labor 
exemption is unlikely because indie movie producers, like itinerant theatre companies, 
look like firms rather than individuals. They also could band together to license such 
movies to major content providers such as iTunes, Amazon, YouTube, and Vimeo, and 
to social networks such as MySpace. The problem here is that no labor market is 
involved.  Producers of indie movies are classic businessmen; as independent 
contractors, they do not substitute for employees and compete with them; they compete 
with and hope to substitute for larger movie producers. The pro-competitive argument 
would be stronger however, if Amazon, iTunes, Hulu, and social networks begin to 
strike more deals providing exclusivity or especially favorable terms to large studios. 
Retired professional football players could break with the Players Association and 
organize a separate concerted effort to bargain with teams over retiree benefits. In Allied 
Chemical and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,402 the Supreme Court, 
disagreeing with the Board, held that retirees are not statutory employees, and therefore 
that the benefits of already-retired persons are not mandatory subjects of bargaining.403 
This makes application of a labor exemption unlikely. The retirees also would be hard-
pressed to marshal a pro-competitive argument under the rule of reason because they 
are no longer competing in either product or labor markets. 
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The Players Association could band together to license player images and personalities 
to fantasy football providers or video game developers providers.  The problem here is 
that the market for player publicity rights is not a labor market; it is a product market. 
Already, the commercial importance of new forms of media providing fans access to 
sports celebrities is generating controversy. In Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc.,404 the district 
court denied a motion to dismiss a right-of-publicity claim by a former college football 
player against a video-game producer. Taking the facts alleged in the plaintiff's 
pleading as true, the court found: 
"In the game, the quarterback for Arizona State University shares many of Plaintiff's 
characteristics. For example, the virtual player wears the same jersey number, is the 
same height and weight and hails from the same state. . . . EA does not depict Plaintiff 
in a different form; he is represented as he what he was: the starting quarterback for 
Arizona State University. Further, . . . the game's setting is identical to where the public 
found Plaintiff during his collegiate career: on the football field."405  
The district court granted a stay pending appeal of related cases.406  
In Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.,407 the district court dismissed an action by a college 
football player against a video game developer for violating his state-law right of 
publicity. The player alleged that a player in the video game had the same height, 
weight, jersey number, type of wrist band, and helmet visor as the actual player, also 
using statistics on playing success identical to those of the actual player.408 Because the 
specific similarities were not pleaded, the court dismissed with leave to file a second 
amended complaint setting forth the specific similarities.409  
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In the Keller case and in a related case, O'Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,410 
college football and basketball players claimed that the NCAA violated the antitrust 
laws by requiring college athletes to authorize the NCAA to use their names and 
likenesses to promote NCAA activities and to relinquish their rights to the commercial 
use of their images.411 Such requirements, the athletes claimed, excluded them from the 
collegiate licensing market. Denying a motion to dismiss, the district court held that the 
plaintiffs had pleaded an agreement that restrained competition,412 and that he made 
out a case under the rule-of-reason.413 A multi-district panel in California reached a 
similar conclusion. 414 
As the market for new technologies to exploit the popularity of entertainment-industry 
celebrities builds, the likelihood of antitrust scrutiny of collective licensing 
arrangements415 will intensify. Because the licensing market is a product market, not 
linked at all directly to any labor market, application of the labor exemption is unlikely, 
but rule-of-reason analysis may nevertheless privilege the arrangements. 
b) New sports revenue streams 
Although the technological revolution is not likely to have much impact on labor 
markets in professional sports, it has already had profound impact on product markets. 
The first battleground focused on television broadcasts, as exemplified by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in NCAA, considered in § ___, and the separate lawsuit filed by the 
NFL Players Association over television revenues during the 2011 lockout. 416 
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Copyright protection for football games and other athletic contests, at least when the 
games are captured on video, gives the leagues and teams a strong lever to control 
exploitation of revenue potential from broader electronic distribution of actual games 
through the Internet. Fantasy sports and videogames, however, need not use actual 
game footage. As to them, leverage is available only under a common-law or statutory 
“right of publicity.”417 
Fantasy sports418 is rapidly growing, with nearly $1 billion in annual revenues.419  
"[F]antasy football” refers to a game in which participants simulate management 
responsibilities of the roster of a NFL team by, among other things, (1) scouting, 
drafting, and trading players on their teams; (2) adding and dropping players; and (3) 
otherwise manipulating the team's roster over the course of the season-long 
competition. To facilitate the competition among the participants in a given fantasy 
football league, the standard fantasy football game utilizes the actual statistics 
generated by NFL players during the course of the regular season."420 The NFL has 
embraced fantasy football to the extent that it has a link on its website.421 No similar link 
exists for videogames. 
The professional sports leagues, teams, and players naturally have an interest in 
tapping some of this revenue—or, less progressively, in trying to shut it down because 
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of a fear that it drain market share from the activities of the leagues. The NFL Players 
Association claims exclusive group licensing rights for players’ rights of publicity.422 
In C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,423 the 
court of appeals held that a provider of fantasy baseball games could use baseball 
players' names and statistics without violating their right of publicity and, moreover, 
had a First Amendment right to use them.424 In CBS Interactive Inc. v. National Football 
Players Ass'n, Inc.,425 the district court applied the Eighth Circuit holding to fantasy 
football, holding that use of football player identities is protected by the First 
Amendment.426 The state of the law on this question is, however, unsettled.427 In Dryer 
v. National Football League,428 however, the district court distinguished actual video 
footage of football players from the data used in fantasy football, and denied a motion 
for summary judgment on First Amendment grounds in a class action brought by 
former professional football players against the the NFL for using promotional video 
footage of them playing.429 
Significantly, for purposes of this article, the fantasy sports producers claimed antitrust 
monopolization by the NFLPA.430 
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The Congress has granted fantasy sports an exemption on prohibitions against Internet 
gambling in Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006,431 by excluding 
fantasy sports from the definition of "bet or wager."432 
Videogames based on professional sports teams and players also are proliferating.433 
The legal issues are the same regarding videogames as for fantasy sports.  
As the technological revolution continues, controversies over who is entitled to make 
money from the celebrity of professional athletes surely will grow. 
c) Ticketing and concert venue monopolies 
The Internet increases economies of scale for sales of tickets to entertainment events, 
and increases economies of scope for linking ticket sales to exhibition of the related 
events. One result was the merger of Ticketmaster with Live Nation, approved by 
United States Department of Justice in 2010.434 
The dominance of such intermediaries naturally leads to controversies over 
monopolization and commercial relations.435 
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d) Enforcing the law against new threats 
Regardless of theoretical analysis of liability when entertainment-industry participants 
limit new forms of competition enabled by the technological revolution, passivity or 
impracticability in enforcing the law is likely to leave large arenas available for 
participants to do as they please. 
The reality is that the Labor Department doesn't enforce the FLSA against the small 
players, and neither is the Internal Revenue Service very aggressive about challenging 
independent-contractor classifications. 
If they're all employees, they are entitled a minimum wage, unemployment 
compensation, and workers comp. There are, of course, some carveouts for part time 
and casual employment, and—importantly--for actors and writers.436 
Nor is trade unionism likely to be a particularly effective means for limiting 
competition. As § ___, explains the transaction costs of establishing and enforcing anti-
competitive arrangements becomes too high when the units of production are 
fragmented, and that is precisely the effect that technology is having. Even fairly large 
movies – those with budgets in the range of $2 million-$10 million, as a very rough 
approximation, use lots of freelance labor. In theater, Actors Equity only penetrates 
approximately 10 to 15%, measured by number of productions, although the figure 
would be much higher measured by percentage of total audience. AFSCME and SAG 
have little sway in indie movie production. The AFM is perhaps the strongest example, 
when one looks at the full range of musical performances and music recording activity 
in an urban area. The AFM does community service work for all musicians but attempts 
to organize the smaller entities and fluid groups of musicians are unknown 
The reality is that many of the producing entities are simply not on anyone's radar 
screen. In some cases they're not formal business entities, but sole proprietorship or, 
common-law partnerships. Even in those cases when they have registered as 
corporations or LLCs, there are too many of them for any trade union to organize them 
cost effectively. So the unions do not try. 
And any rational administrative agency is going to set enforcement priorities. It's hard 
to conceive of a rational enforcement strategy that would devote significant resources to 
targeting the low-end. 
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So: the result is a formal regime that bears little resemblance to the actual structure of 
labor markets in the entertainment industry. 
And reality is that the enforcement strategies of administrative agencies in the labor 
field have always influenced heavily by what trade unions think is important. So what 
will trade unions think it is important? Equity, SAG/AFTRA, and the AFM are 
reasonably strong unions. So are the AFL Players Association and its counterparts in 
other sports 
Some ideas can be gleaned from tensions between union and nonunion construction, 
union and nonunion trucking, heavily unionized and nonunion or only partially 
unionized airlines. 
And all of these cases the threat to collectively bargain labor standards and union 
security appeared not in the form of new labor market phenomena (contracting out 
being a notable exception); rather it appeared in the form of new product market 
competition. 
So where is this most likely in the entertainment industry? It is not at all likely in 
professional football. The notion that arena football could begin to steal market share 
from the NFL is ludicrous. On the other hand, newly rising sports like soccer could 
begin to gain market share at the expense of other sports, making it a threat. 
In music, the product market transformation probably is too far gone for the union 
movement to do anything about it. The recording industry is still clinging on to some 
established celebrities, but the relationship between artists and recording studios has 
never been understood to be an employment relationship. 437 That means that the AFM 
has no beachhead from which to operate with respect to recorded music. 
Likewise in theater, although the much greater audience drawing power of larger 
equity theaters compared with smaller storefront theaters is so profound and the 
migration from the lower stratum for the higher strata is so much a part of the ambition 
of actors and other theater people that something like the current market structure is 
likely to persist 
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It is in video entertainment for the changes are likely to be most dramatic. The 
possibility for crowd sourcing of important functions in moviemaking,438 the entry of 
new Internet-oriented entities like Amazon, Google, Hulu, and Netflix, the ease with 
which truly indie moviemakers can use the same tools now being embraced by the large 
players to distribute video entertainment product all portend significant turmoil in the 
years to come as the technological revolution continues 
It always has been the case that the establishment uses every tool at its disposal – labor 
law, antitrust law, aggressive business and litigation credit strategies--to crush or at 
least defer the success of new entrants using new business models. 
It will do so this case, also. 
5. Contraction of the labor exemption and more rule-of-reason 
analysis 
When no labor union is involved, the scope of the labor exemption is extremely small: 
the core policy underpinning both exemptions is the public-policy decision to promote 
collective bargaining. When there is no collective bargaining to regulate the labor 
market, and no prospect of its coming into existence, defenders of an anti-competitive 
arrangement are hard-pressed to argue that a labor exemption is available. If an 
employment relationship must be the “matrix of the controversy” for an exemption to 
be available, and less of the commerce occurs through employment relationships, the 
operation of the exemptions diminishes. 
That means that more business arrangements that allegedly interfere with competition 
are subject to antitrust analysis. In dealing with its increasing inventory of disputes, 
antitrust law must balance certain fundamental marketplace realities: 
 economies of scale--ISPs, social networks, web search, movie and music portals 
 aggregation of capital and cross subsidization 
pitted against 
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 desire of fading establishments to throw up barriers to new, more efficient, 
competitors 
 desire of artists to be able to support themselves with their art 
6. Two hypothetical scenarios 
Two closely related fictional scenarios help integrate the analysis of the types of 
disputes likely to arise in the entertainment industries under pressure from the 
technological revolution.439 
Amory Richards is a young cinematographer employed by Walt Disney Studios. He is 
represented by the International Cinematographers Guild, part of the International 
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (“IATSE”), of which he is a member. A collective 
bargaining agreement covers his employment. 
Selnick Edwards is a young video editor employed by the production division of 
Comcast. The National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians 
(“NABET”), part of the Communications Workers of America (“CWA”) represents 
Comcast video editors but Selnick has elected not to become a member, electing instead 
to pay an agency fee to the union under an agency-shop agreement. A collective 
bargaining agreement covers Selnick’s employment with Comcast. 
Amory and Selnick studied filmmaking at Columbia College in Chicago with Kendrick 
Marshall. Kendrick has entered into an agreement with a recent graduate of Chicago-
Kent College of Law, Andrew Zeer to produce Andrew’s screenplay, No Fun League. 
Kendrick has worked out a shot list and shooting schedule and is ready to begin 
principal photography. He contacts Amory and asks him to be the cinematographer. 
Amory is excited and agrees to take part in the project “on spec;” i.e. he won’t get paid 
anything unless the movie makes money. If it does, he will get 5% of the net profits. 
Kendrick makes a similar deal with Selnick to be the editor of No Fun League 
Disney has heard about No Fun League and is quite worried that it will dilute the 
audience for Disney’s new blockbuster, Mouseketeers Retreaded Again, featuring Justin 
Timberlake, Keri Russell, and Ryan Gosling. The budget for Mouseketeers Retreaded 
Again is $200 million. The budget for No Fun League is $75,000. Disney figures that No 
                                                 
439  The good analysis in this section was written by Jeremy B. Abrams, research assistant to the author. 
103 
 
Fun League will never get made if Marshall has to pay Amory the same compensation he 
is entitled to from Disney. 
The cinematographers are concerned about the impact on their wage levels. They also 
understand that if the market for Disney's movie is reduced that that will undermine 
employment opportunities. Disney communicates its fear to the cinematographers. The 
cinematographers pick up the ball. The tell Disney to fire Amory, and tell him it will 
expel him and make sure Disney fires him if he works for Kendrick for any less than 
Disney pays him. 
Comcast is likewise worried that No Fun League will prove so popular that Comcast 
subscribers will drop their subscriptions and flock to see No Fun League on the Internet, 
paying for it through their Amazon accounts. It tells Selnick that he will be fired if he 
works for Kendrick for any less than he is paid by Comcast. 
What legal claims might Amory and Selnick have against Disney, the 
Cinematographers Guild, Comcast or NABET? How strong are they? 
In order to determine whether Amory, Selnick, or Marshall could recover against the 
IATSE, Disney, or Comcast, one must understand (1) whether the conduct they object to 
is exempt from antitrust law, (2) whether it would survive rule-of-reason scrutiny if it is 
not exempt, (3) whether any of them have antitrust standing, and whether the conduct 
constitutes a secondary boycott under the NLRA. 
Plaintiffs could argue that neither the actions of the IATSE or Disney fall within the 
statutory exemption provided by the Clayton Act and Norris-LaGuardia, nor the non-
statutory labor exemption created by the judiciary.  Thus, if they have standing, Amory 
and Marshall would be in a strong position to prevail against IATSE and Disney for 
violating the Sherman Act by colluding with each other to restrain trade.  
In the case at hand, there are two ways Amory's activity could negatively impact the 
wages of union employees at Disney: (1) the union's bargaining position could be 
weakened, eventually driving down the wages of union members; (2) the success of No 
Fun League could increase competition in the product market, thereby driving down 
Disney's revenue and, eventually, the wages and even job security of union members. 




The IATSE would argue that its action to prevent Amory from working for Marshall at 
anything less than Disney standards falls within the exemption because it is necessary 
to protect its collectively bargained standards.  Amory is not likely to be unique: if he is 
willing to work for Marshall for less than his compensation at Disney, others will do the 
same thing—for Marshall and others like him. Disney could reduce its costs by laying 
off its employees, including Amory, and hiring Marshall and others like him to do their 
work.  Any employer wants to buy labor at the lowest possible price.  Without a wage 
floor, competition between potential employees will drive down wages—at least when 
the labor supply exceed the demand. Preventing that is the central goal of collective 
bargaining.  Thus, if a large number of workers on the job market seek to work below 
union wages, Disney could replace union employees with the cheaper alternatives.  
Seeking to maintain this form of “uniformity of labor standards” is a “legitimate aim” of 
the IATSE.  It thus appears that this side agreement is subject to the nonstatutory labor 
exemption. 
If, however, it is found that the antitrust laws do apply, the question becomes whether 
the IATSE’s side agreement with Amory is a per se violation or, if not, whether it passes 
the rule of reason.   Non-compete agreements between employers and their employees 
are not per se violations of the Sherman Act.440 A non-compete agreement prohibits an 
employee of one company from working for a competitor under any conditions.   It 
follows fortiori that a less stringent agreement between an employer and an employee 
(such as the one between Disney and Amory) that prohibits an employee from working 
for a competitor if certain conditions are not met is also not a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act. 
While the IATSE’s side agreement with Amory may not be a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act, it is a violation under the rule of reason.  [the introduction did not say 
that the analysis would cover the rule of reason, but it should]Large production 
companies like Disney can afford to pay more to their employees than can their 
independent competitors.  Allowing unions to forbid members from working below the 
high standards set by these companies would risk putting independent production 
companies out of business.  Such a result would have a devastating effect on the 
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competitive nature of the product market.  The benefit provided to the union 
(strengthened bargaining position) does not outweigh the harm caused to independent 
producers (elimination).  
Decreasing competition in the product market in order to protect the labor market is not 
a legitimate objective; even if it were, it fails the rule of reason test. 
Plaintiffs would argue that IATSE does not have the power to stay within the labor 
exemption while preventing the impact that No Fun League’s financial success would 
have on union wages.  While a union's direct activities on the labor market may have an 
indirect impact on the product market, any activity taken by a union to impact the 
product market directly constitutes an illegitimate objective that is not exempt from 
antitrust law.   
Plaintiffs would argue that the IATSE could prevent harm to union wages due to 
increased competition in the product market only by actually limiting competition in 
the product market.  In this case, it is known that Amory is essential to the existence of 
Disney's competitor in the product market (i.e., No Fun League).  IATSE's conduct 
would not be exempt from antitrust law if it intended to shut down No Fun League by 
making Amory unaffordable. 
Even if IATSE’s objective were legitimate IATSE’s conduct would not pass the rule of 
reason.  Once again, the minor benefit such side agreements would have on the labor 
market does not outweigh the potentially "significant adverse effects on the market and 
on consumers-effects unrelated to the union's legitimate goals of organizing workers 
and standardizing working conditions."441  
The side agreement between Comcast and Selnick requires a simpler analysis. Comcast 
is a non-labor organization seeking to negotiate with a member of a labor group (e.g., 
Selnick) for the sole purpose of manipulating the product market.  Thus, as with 
Amory, Plaintiff’s would argue that Comcast’s objective is illegitimate and does not 
pass the rule of reason. 
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 Connell Const. Co., Inc at 624  (holding that union’s attempt to force contractor to not subcontract 
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While a union's direct activities on the labor market may have an indirect impact on the 
product market, any activity taken by a union to impact the product market directly 
constitutes an illegitimate objective that is not exempt from antitrust regulations 
As with IATSE, even if Comcast had a legitimate objective, its conduct would not pass 
the rule of reason.  Once again, the minor benefit such side agreements would have on 
the labor market does not outweigh the potentially "significant adverse effects on the 
market and on consumers-effects unrelated to the union's legitimate goals of organizing 
workers and standardizing working conditions."442  
Simply establishing an agreement that falls outside the exemptions and fails rule-of-
reason analysis, however, is not enough to allow Amory, Selnick, or Marshall to recover 
for the antitrust violation; they also much have standing.  Amory, Selnick, and Marshall 
are going to have a hard time establishing standing to sue for antitrust violations. The 
class of plaintiffs capable of establishing antitrust standing is limited to consumers and 
competitors in the restrained market.443 
CBC Companies, Inc. v. Equifax, Inc.444 involved Sherman Act sections 1 and 2 claims 
against Equifax for hiking the fees it imposed on the plaintiff for reselling Equifax credit 
data. The plaintiff claimed monopolization and attempted monopolization of the 
market for credit reports sold to mortgage lenders.445 The court of appeals agreed with 
the district court that the plaintiff had failed to plead antitrust injury. "To prove  
antitrust injury, the key inquiry is whether competition-not necessarily a competitor-
suffered as a result of the challenged business practice. One competitor may not use the 
antitrust laws to sue a rival merely for vigorous or intensified competition. . . . An 
antitrust plaintiff [must] demonstrate that the alleged violation tended to reduce 
competition overall and that the plaintiff's injury was a consequence of the resulting 
diminished competition."446 Although the complaint alleged that the plaintiff and other 
                                                 
442 Id.  
443 West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 102 (3d Cir. 2010) (reversing summary 
judgment for defendant in part and holding that an agreement with the dominant hospital artificially to 
depress prices paid by a monopsonist health insurer by the second hospital established antitrust injury). 
444  561 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2009). 
445  561 F.3d at 571 (summarizing legal theory). 
446  561 F.3d at 571-572 [internal quotations and citations omitted]. 
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resellers were the principal victims of Equifax's conduct, it "never identifies any of these 
other resellers, and never establishes whether any of these resellers signed a contract 
similar to the Reseller Agreement.”447 "Essentially, CBC disagrees with the price terms 
of the contract that Equifax proposed and CBC later signed. But even where a business 
carries a significant portion of the market share, antitrust law is not a negotiating tool 
for a plaintiff seeking better contract terms. Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not give 
plaintiffs the exclusive right to dictate the terms on which they will deal, nor does it 
require the defendant to accede to every demand of the plaintiffs. "448 
That means that Amory and Selnick cannot establish antitrust standing merely by 
showing that they, as individuals, were deprived of the opportunity to sell their 
services to Marshall; they would have to show that the conduct by Disney, Comcast, 
and the unions reduced competition in the market for indie cinematographers and 
editors generally and that they were injured as a result. Likewise, Marshall cannot 
establish antitrust injury unless he pleads and proves that the conduct diminished 
competition in the movie production market and that he was injured as a result. 
Sterling Merchandising, Inc. v. Nestle, S.A.449 involved Sherman Act sections 1 and 2 
claims against the dominant supplier of ice cream in Puerto Rico for its acquisition of a 
distributor that competed with the plaintiff and its subsequent pricing and contracting 
policies. The plaintiff was dependent on the defendant for its most popular brand of ice 
cream. The court of appeals, agreeing with the district court, held that the plaintiff 
failed to show, at the summary judgment stage, antitrust injury, because the evidence 
showed that the plaintiff’s market share and profits had increased during the period of 
the allegedly illegal conduct and that the defendant continued to make ice cream 
available to it. The plaintiff argued that it would have done even better but for the 
defendant's conduct, but the court found evidence supporting that proposition 
unpersuasive: 
"The lack of evidence of antitrust injury in the form of either increased consumer prices 
or reduced output is consistent with the lack of evidence that Sterling itself has been 
negatively affected by Nestlé PR's purported violations. It is axiomatic that antitrust 
laws are concerned with protecting against impairments to a market's competitiveness 
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448  561 F.3d at 573 [internal quotations and citations omitted]. 
449  656 F.3d 112 (1st Cir. 2011). 
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and not impairments to any one market actor. It is also true that an antitrust plaintiff's 
post-violation successes do not necessarily preclude compensation for damages 
proximately caused by an antitrust violation. Nonetheless, that Sterling's sales, profits, 
and market share have increased during the relevant period provides further indication 
that no antitrust injury exists here."450 
That suggests that Amory, Selnick, and Marshall could establish antitrust injury only if 
they offered evidence that competition in the movie production market and in the 
markets for indie cinematographers and editors was declining, resulting in declining 
revenues and market share for indie producers and declining demand for indie 
cinematographers and editors. 
Moreover, Amory and Selnick may have difficulty establishing the directness of any 
injury to them. In Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of 
Carpenters,451 The Supreme Court cautioned against allowing antitrust injury to be 
establish by a long chain of causation: 
"In this case, . . . the Union was neither a consumer nor a competitor in the market in 
which trade was restrained. It is not clear whether the Union's interests would be 
served or disserved by enhanced competition in the market."452 "[T]he chain of 
causation between the Union's injury and the alleged restraint in the market for 
construction subcontracts contains several somewhat vaguely defined links."453 
"Partly because it is indirect, and partly because the alleged effects on the Union may 
have been produced by independent factors, the Union's damages claim is also highly 
speculative. There is, for example, no allegation that any collective bargaining 
agreement was terminated as a result of the coercion, no allegation that the aggregate 
share of the contracting market controlled by union firms has diminished, no allegation 
that the number of employed union members has declined, and no allegation that the 
Union's revenues in the form of dues or initiation fees have decreased. Moreover, 
                                                 
450  656 F.3d at 122-123 [internal quotations and citations omitted]. 
451  459 U.S. 519 (1983) (reversing court of appeals and holding that union claiming a conspiracy to shift 
work from union to non-union contracts could not establish antitrust injury). 
452  459 U.S. at 539. 
453 459 U.S. at 540. 
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although coercion against certain firms is alleged, there is no assertion that any such 
firm was prevented from doing business with any union firms or that any firm or group 
of firms was subjected to a complete boycott."454 
Amory and Selnick would have to establish that they lost employment opportunities 
because they were forced to demand higher compensation. If other indie 
cinematographers and editors remain free to work for less, that would help them 
establish individual injury but would undercut their argument that competition in 
general had been limited. Marshall would have to establish that he, along with other 
indie producers lost business as a result of the limitations on wage competition. To do 
that, he would have to marshal evidence (a) that Disney and Comcast had sufficient 
market power to drive up wages in the indie producer market (b) that the increased 
wages adversely affected Marshall’s ability to earn revenue, and (c) that any economic 
misfortune suffered by Marshall was not due to other factors. 
All of this is a very tall order, necessitating heroic econometric analysis, unlikely to be 
available to any of the plausible plaintiffs. 
It is likely that both the agreement between the IATSE and Amory or the agreement 
between Comcast and Selnick violate U.S. antitrust law.  Neither agreement falls within 
the statutory or nonstatutory labor exemptions to antitrust law.  Amory, Selnick and 
Marshall would have a very hard time, however, establishing standing to sue IATSE, 
Disney, or Comcast for antitrust violations.  
If the conduct violates section 8(b)(4) or 8(e) of the NLRA, Amory, Selnick, and Marshall 
can sue for damages,455 under labor law, but coverage by section 8(b)(4) prevents a 
direct antitrust claim under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.456 
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456  Compare Baker v. IBP, Inc. 357 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that preemption has nothing to 
do with federal claims filed in federal court but that doctrines of primary jurisdiction and abstention may 
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The 8(b)(4)B)(ii) argument with respect to both Amory and Selnick is that the union is: 
"forcing or requiring any person [Amory and Selnick] . . .  to cease doing business with 
any other person [Marshall . . . .457 
The questions are (a) whether the union, is (b) "forcing or requiring", 458and (c) 
whether a literal violation is an actual violation, given that the target of the subsection is 
"secondary" pressure. What's the primary dispute? 
VII. Hope for the future 
The technology-driven revolution in the entertainment industries has enormous 
potential to enrich art, broaden the entertainment choices available to everyone, and to 
increase the probability that artists can earn the personal fulfillment that comes from 
exposing their art to people who enjoy it. For that potential to be realized, however, 
legal and political institutions must embrace certain propositions about the revolution 
and its likely outcomes and be guided by certain other propositions about government 
intervention. 
Economies of scale yield larger and larger bottlenecks that have the power to erect 
barriers to entry and are few enough in number to be organized effectively 459 
                                                                                                                                                             
claim was completely preempted because non-union contractor fired by construction project due to union 
pressure had arguable claim under section 8(b)(4)). 
457   29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B)(ii). 
458  See Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Intern. Ass'n, 949 F.2d 1241, 1255-1256(3d Cir. 1991) (finding 
that threat to cancel prehire agreement may constitute coercion under 8(b)(4); Sheet Metal Workers, Local 
Union No. 91 v. N.L.R.B., 905 F.2d 417, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Harry Edwards, J.) (finding coercion under 
8(b)(4) from union threatening to withhold wage concessions unless employer agreed to terminate 
relations with non-union firms in violation of section 8(e)); N.L.R.B. v. Local 825, A,B,C,D, Intern. Union 
of Operating Engineers, 659 F.2d 379, 385 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding that warning by union business agent 
about non-union contractor coming on job site did not constitute “threat” under 8(b)(4)). 
459  The Federal Circuit recognized the legitimacy of considering economies of scale on the pro-
competitive side of the balancing in rule-of-reason analysis. Princo Corp. v. International Trade Com'n, 
616 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The case involved a claim of patent misuse by an importer, alleging 
that horizontal agreements among patent holders to set standards violated the rule of reason. 616 F.3d at 
1335. The court of appeals, aggreeing with the International Trade Commission, held that the pro-
competitive effect of the standards for writable CDs past muster under rule of reason analysis.See also 
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The most promising fountains of creative innovation are too small to challenge the 
barriers and too numerous to be organized 
Governmental institutions are, for the most part, unlikely to fill the breach because they 
have been captured by the defenders of the old, who are terrified by the new, and by 
the new empires that want to protect and enhance their market dominance. Because of 
this, the safest course is a presumption of legal abstention and reliance on markets to 
sort out supply of and demand for new products.  
So what's to be done?460 
1. Enact Net Neutrality legislation and defend its principles against copyright-
enforcement overreaching. 
2. Do not try to break up Google, Amazon, or Netflix merely because they are big and 
dominate their markets. In United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,461 the Supreme 
Court recognized that technology may produce increasing economies of scale that lead 
to concentration in an industry--legitimate under the antitrust laws--while also making 
easier for the smaller number of competitors to engage in "parallel policies of mutual 
advantage" rather than letting competition flourish.462 
3. Re-educate the public, the judiciary, and the bar about copyright, trademark, and 
rights of publicity to counter the propaganda of the old guard 
4. Hope for more grass-roots Internet-oriented movements such as the Net Neutrality 
movement and the anti-PROTECT IP SOPA movements 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Golden Bridge Technology, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 273 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting Sherman Act 
claim that standards-enforcement activity violated rule of reason; considering economies of scale). 
460  See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet at 20: Evolution of a Constitution for Cyberspace, 20 Wm. & 
Mary Rts. J. 1115, 1179 (2012) (arguing that the Internet's "constitution" has been validated by the 
Internet's success). 
461   410 U.S. 526 (1973). 
462   410 U.S. at 550-551 (reversing judgment for defendant in Clayton Act suit to enjoin acquitioon of 
competing beer producer). 
